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“Other Than Honorable” 
Discrimination 
Marcy L. Karin† 
Abstract 
The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights 
Act (USERRA) is the most comprehensive federal civil rights law that 
exists related to the workplace. Its goal is to help people who serve in 
the military reintegrate back into civilian work and remain attached to 
the workforce. It does so by offering a mix of anti-discrimination pro-
tection and labor standards. Despite the promise of robust re-
employment rights and post-service assistance, Congress has excluded 
people with a certain “character of service,” including those with “other 
than honorable” separations, from these protections. This statutory 
exclusion has a disparate impact on people with service-connected 
disabilities, servicemembers who have experienced military sexual 
trauma, and troops with caregiving responsibilities. This Article 
proposes an end to this discriminatory exclusion along with a way to 
improve USERRA’s accommodation rights. In so doing, the Article 
explores how this exclusion contravenes the original congressional 
intent. It also situates the proposal in an over seventy-five-year history 
of expanding the law after every major conflict on fairness grounds to 
reflect the military reality of the time. Finally, the Article counters 
some anticipated critiques of the proposal and places it within a growing 
series of military supportive movements (such as the emergence of 
veterans courts and changes to the way post-traumatic stress disorder, 
traumatic brain injury, and military sexual trauma are handled) as well 
as ongoing employment-law efforts (like calls to ban the box). 
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Introduction 
Samuel Earl Tootle served in the Navy for fourteen years.1 During 
that time, he separated from the military three times under honorable 
conditions.2 His “fourth and final discharge,” however, was the result of 
a court martial conviction, and deemed dishonorable.3 Years later, Mr. 
Tootle quit a civilian job with the Department of Veterans Affairs, one 
day before he believed he would have been fired for failing to disclose 
his dishonorable discharge.4 On July 11, 2012, Mr. Tootle alleged that 
his separation from work was due to the employer’s discrimination 
 
1. Tootle v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 559 F. App’x 998, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
2. Id. at 998–99. 
3. Id. at 999. 
4. Id. 
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against his military service in a claim brought under the Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA).5 
Enacted in 1994, USERRA was meant to address this very situ-
ation. The law’s goal was to help servicemembers with the process of 
reintegrating into civilian life after military service, as well as to help 
them remain attached to the workforce once reemployed.6 USERRA is 
the latest iteration of a law that has been around since 1940 to ensure 
that those who protect our country are not left behind when they re-
turn.7 In theory, the unique mix of protections found in USERRA 
combines to create a comprehensive civil rights law that responds to a 
unique government need to encourage service and support those who 
have chosen to do so.8 In reality, however, after every war, stories sur-
face about how some servicemembers cannot return to work despite the 
protections that Congress envisioned. Mr. Tootle’s experience is just 
one such story. In his case, the court found that he did not have 
standing to proceed as he did not have the correct character of service.9 
Relying on a provision of USERRA that excludes people with “bad” 
military separations from utilizing the law’s protections, the court 
dismissed his case.10 His one “bad” discharge took away his right to 
coverage under USERRA, despite his years of honorable service and 
three prior honorable separations. 
This denial of legal protections based on a bad “character of 
service” designation is an unnecessary form of congressional discr-
imination. It is also one that has become increasingly problematic 
during the three Gulf War-Era II conflicts: Operation Enduring 
 
5. Id. 
6. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 
Pub. L. No. 103-353, sec. 2, § 4301, 108 Stat. 3149, 3150 (codified at 38 
U.S.C. §§ 4301–4331 (2012)). 
7. S.J. Res. 286, 76th Cong. (1940); see infra note 27 (discussing the law’s 
inception). 
8. See, e.g., John Marshall Law School, Video 2.2: Employment Rights and 
Policy Changes, YouTube (July 18, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=7VoXbwn1VUU [https://perma.cc/3ZFL-KYHR] (labeling 
USERRA as comprehensive civil rights legislation). 
9. Tootle v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 559 F. App’x 998, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 
(citing 38 U.S.C. § 4304(2)); see also Adams v. Penn Lines Servs., Inc., 620 
F. Supp. 2d 835, 839 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (holding that honorable discharge is 
necessary for protection under USERRA); Whisnant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 83 
M.S.P.B. 588, at ¶¶ 3–4 (1999) (same). 
10. Tootle, 559 F. App’x at 1001; see also 5 Emp. Coord. Employment 
Practices § 21:15 (2016), Westlaw (protection limited to those honorably 
discharged). 
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Freedom (OEF),11 Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),12 and Operation 
New Dawn (OND).13 These conflicts have seen a historic number of 
activations and demobilizations, including the deployment of over 2.1-
million servicemembers.14 They also have included the largest number 
of Reserve Component (RC) members to be called up for federal service 
due to changing operational tempos and national-security needs, with 
one third of those deployed being part-time citizen RC members.15 
During these conflicts, most RC members have been activated for 
multiple tours of active duty, requiring them to leave civilian work, 
reintegrate back to a non-military employer, and then leave and 
reintegrate again.16 This cycle of leaving and returning to the civilian 
workforce has been experienced by huge numbers of troops—both re-
gular active duty and RC members. Indeed, according to the Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs, from 2014 to 2020, one million service-
members will join the 2.3-million people who have already transitioned 
from military service to civilian life since the Gulf War-Era II began.17 
Similarly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate that about 250,000 
 
11. OEF began on October 7, 2001, and has not yet ended. U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Off., GAO-14-676, Veterans Affairs: Better 
Understanding Needed to Enhance Services to Veterans Re-
adjusting to Civilian Life 5 n.10 (2014) [hereinafter GAO-14-676]. 
12. OIF ran from March 19, 2003 to August 31, 2010. Id. 
13. OND ran from September 1, 2010 through December 15, 2011. Id. 
14. Id. at 5. 
15. Id.; see 10 U.S.C. § 10101(a) (2012) (defining reserve components of the armed 
forces as the Army National Guard, the Air National Guard, and the Army, 
Navy, Marine, Air Force, and Coast Guard Reserves). Reservists are under 
Federal control. See 10 U.S.C. § 12301 (2012) (giving the Secretary authority 
over members of active and reserve components of the military). The National 
Guard, which consists of the Army and Air National Guards, may be called 
upon by the President to serve in the same positions as active duty regular 
forces. See 10 U.S.C. § 10103 (2012) (giving Congress authority to order 
members of the reserves to active duty as necessary for a balanced force). 
16. See Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 
2012 and the Future Years Defense Program: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Armed Services, 112th Cong. 96 (2011) (statement of Col. Steven P. 
Stonebridge, Director of Government Relations, Military Officers 
Association of America) (“There is no precedent in American history for this 
[post-9/11] sustained reliance on citizen-soldiers . . . .”). Effective January 
2007, the DOD limits RC mobilizations to under a year; there are no limits 
to the number of times someone may be deployed. U.S. Gov’t 
Accountability Off., GAO-08-790R, Military Personnel: DOD 
Needs Data to Determine if Active Duty Service Has an Impact 
on the Ability of Guard and Reservists to Maintain Their 
Civilian Professional Licenses or Certificates 1 (2008) [hereinafter 
GAO-08-790R]. 
17. GAO-14-676, supra note 11, at 1. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
"Other Than Honorable" Discrimination 
139 
servicemembers will separate from the military each year from 2015 to 
2020.18 Some of these separated men and women will come back to the 
jobs they had before answering the call to serve; others will be looking 
for new employment. When they do, civilian employers are asked to 
shoulder some of the responsibility of military service by making jobs 
available to (re)employ the country’s service personnel. If employers fail 
to do so, former military personnel become detached from the civilian 
workforce and the corresponding economic security and transition 
assistance that employment offers. This is exactly why USERRA was 
enacted. 
Yet, the experiences of servicemembers during Gulf War-Era II 
have exposed some cracks with USERRA. Despite the military’s 
promise to help and congressional protection for some, reintegration to 
civilian life has proved difficult for many, and the unemployment rate 
for Gulf War-Era II veterans has consistently been higher than both 
the national average and the numbers for other veterans.19 Of course, 
after fifteen years of war and a recession, providing economic stability 
to transitioning servicemembers is critical. This is especially so for a 
group of troops who have been categorically denied USERRA coverage, 
and by extension, access to some of the promised enticements to and 
benefits of military service. 
This group of forgotten troops includes a large number of people 
who have received “other than honorable” separations from the 
military. As explained below, these separations have disproportionately 
impacted people with service-connected injuries like post-traumatic 
stress disorder and traumatic brain injury, servicemembers who have 
experienced military sexual trauma, and people with caregiving 
responsibilities. These troops unnecessarily have been denied access to 
USERRA’s protection and reintegration assistance; the time has come 
to fix this. 
As described below, there is an unusual history of bipartisan, bi-
cameral work to amend USERRA in response to the changing military 
needs of the time. There is also a history of expanding the law to pro-
vide consistency amongst types of service and servicemembers, as well 
as to ensure that wounded warriors may access the law’s protections. 
Historically, Congress acts after coverage cracks have been exposed. 
Accordingly, this Article surfaces another crack that has been exposed 
during Gulf War-Era II—the discriminatory treatment of a class of  
18. Off. of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Enabling 
Collaborative Support to Reintegrate the Military Family 4 
(2014). 
19. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, USDL-16-
0611, News Release: Employment Situation of Veterans—2015 
(2016), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/vet.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
FS6X-4KYK] (reporting that unemployment rates for Gulf War-Era II 
veterans in 2014 and 2015 were higher than the rates for all veterans and 
nonveterans). 
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servicemembers with other than honorable separations. This Article 
then offers a proposal to fix this crack by amending USERRA to include 
this group of forgotten troops and give teeth to a requirement that 
employers work to qualify returning servicemembers for post-service, 
civilian positions. Part I of this Article explains this history and offers 
an overview of USERRA’s core protections. Part II contains the stories 
of these forgotten troops, stemming from the explosion of RC and other 
servicemembers who have returned to civilian workplaces during the 
Gulf War-Era II conflicts. It also contains the proposal to amend 
USERRA in response to the experiences contained in the stories. 
Finally, Part III predicts some critiques of the proposal, which are then 
countered by situating the proposal in the broader context of ongoing 
employment law and military supportive movements. 
I. USERRA’s Promise and Core Provisions 
The increase and ultimate drawdown of troops during Gulf War-
Era II is not the first time that America has been faced with a large-
scale reintegration of former servicemembers to civilian life after a 
period of military conflict. During World War I, for example, men who 
left to serve in the military were promised that their civilian jobs would 
be held for them.20 Yet, servicemembers who returned home from war 
could not get their jobs back. Younger men who had not answered the 
call to serve had pushed the military personnel out of worksites across 
the country.21 At the same time, jobs had disappeared in the lead up to 
the depression. The civilian workforce simply could not absorb the 
number of troops returning in such a fast demobilization. The ensuing 
reintegration process was difficult, and a significant period of veterans’ 
unemployment ensued.22 After watching this generation of 
servicemembers return from war to unemployment, Congress wanted to 
act. The intent was to make sure members of the military, especially 
those that were “forcibly taken out of industry,” had the right to return 
to work in the future.23 Post-service employment was a morale issue for 
the military and transformed into a moral imperative for Congress. 
 
20. See Andrew P. Sparks, From the Desert to the Courtroom: The Uniformed 
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 61 Hastings L.J. 773, 
776 (2010) (noting that there was “[w]idespread apprehension” that such a 
large scale demobilization “would create profound economic disturbances”). 
21. 86 Cong. Rec. 10,346 (1940) (statement of Rep. Van Zandt). 
22. Thomas R. Haggard, Veterans’ Reemployment Rights and the “Escalator 
Principal,” 51 B.U. L. Rev. 539, 539 (1971). 
23. Selective Compulsory Military Training and Service: Hearing on H.R. 
10132 Before the H. Comm. on Military Affairs, 76th Cong. 118 (1940) 
(statement of Rep. Thomason) (expressing a hope that this would correct 
the problem experienced after World War I). 
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Part of this imperative came from the recognition that the United 
States needed to have a steady stream of available servicemembers 
should another war break out. In addition, the country needed to be 
able to take care of those servicemembers when hostilities ceased.24 This 
created a structural mismatch between the needs of the country to call 
up a full force of military personnel in the name of national defense, 
and the reality that those people were displaced from the civilian 
workforce when they served and were often forgotten when they 
returned, especially if they came home with a disability. As a result, 
employment for veterans became “a national responsibility,”25 and 
Congress believed that the right to reemployment after service “would 
play a significant part in lessening economic maladjustments” that 
“inevitably accompany” a national military.26 
This responsibility led to a 1940 congressional resolution to address 
the needs of the country to preserve a unified national defense with a 
strong military that could fluctuate in size depending on current 
events.27 This resolution provided people who were drafted into service 
with a right to return to work at a public or private employer with the 
benefits and status of employment they would have had but for the 
service.28 The hope was that this would ensure men for the military and 
curb unemployment of those men after service. A few months later, the 
Selective Training and Service Act codified the resolution as part of the 
measure that created the draft that authorized men to be involuntarily 
called into service in preparation for World War II.29 A year later, 
coverage under the law was expanded to provide the same 
reemployment rights to everyone that entered active service. This time, 
 
24. Matt Crotty, The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act and Washington State’s Veteran’s Affairs Statute: Still Short on 
Protecting Reservists from Hiring Discrimination, 43 Gonz. L. Rev. 169, 
173 (2007). 
25. U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., GAO/HEHS-98-240R, Veterans’ 
Employment and Training Service: Assessment of the Fiscal 
Year 1999 Performance Plan 1 (1998). 
26. 86 Cong. Rec. 9,977 (1940) (statement of Sen. Thomas). 
27. S.J. Res. 286, 76th Cong., 54 Stat. 858 (1940); see also S. Rep. No. 76-2002, 
at 7 (1940) (“The purpose of this measure is the protection of the United 
States. To insure the independence and the freedom of the people[,] . . . it 
provides that immediate measures shall be taken to mobilize a large portion of 
the Nation’s military strength.”). 
28. S.J. Res. 286. 
29. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-783, sec. 8, 54 
Stat. 885, 890. 
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people who volunteered for service were granted corresponding 
reemployment rights.30 
Through each of these expansions, the goal has remained constant: 
national security.31 Indeed, in the twenty-seven iterations of this law 
over the seventy-five years since the original resolution,32 Congress has 
consistently tried to meet that goal by protecting people who were con-
scripted into service, and, later, to encourage people to sign up for or 
stay in military service to keep the country safe. The law became even 
more important—particularly to “part-time” RC members—after the 
military switched to a Total Force policy in 1973. Before this time, if 
the country went to war, the RC forces were viewed only as supplement 
 
30. Service Extension Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-213, sec. 7, 55 Stat. 626, 627; 
H.R. Rep. No. 77-1117, at 6 (1941). 
31. USERRA was authorized under the War Powers Act. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, 
Can Congress Use Its War Powers to Protect Military Employees from State 
Sovereign Immunity?, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 999, 1018 (2004) (exploring 
the impact of the war powers authorization on a former USERRA exclusion 
that prevented state employees from suing state employers). 
32. S.J. Res. 286; 54 Stat. 885; 55 Stat. 626, 626–28; Selective Training and 
Service Act of 1940 Amendment, Pub. L. No. 78-473, 58 Stat. 798 (1944); 
Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, 62 Stat. 604; Universal 
Military Training and Service Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 82-51, 65 Stat. 
75 (1951); Universal Military Training and Service Act Amendment, Pub. L. 
No. 84-665, 70 Stat. 509 (1956); Universal Military Training and Service Act 
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 86-632, 74 Stat. 467 (1960); Universal Military 
Training and Service Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-391, 75 Stat. 821 
(1961); Universal Military Training and Service Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 
90-491, 82 Stat. 790 (1968); Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance 
Act (VRAA) of 1974, Pub. L. 93-508, sec. 404, § 2021, 88 Stat. 1578, 1594; 
Act of May 14, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-286, sec. 2, § 2024, 90 Stat. 517, 518; 
Veterans’ Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976 (VEEAA), 
Pub. L. No. 94-502, secs. 605, 608, §§ 2003, 2021, 2024, 90 Stat. 2383, 2405; 
Veterans’ Rehabilitation and Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-466, sec. 511, § 2024, 94 Stat. 2171, 2207; Act of Oct. 12, 1982, Pub. L. 
No. 97-295, sec. 4, 96 Stat. 1287, 1310; Veterans’ Benefits Improvement and 
Health-Care Authorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-576, sec. 331, § 
2021(b)(3), 100 Stat. 3248, 3279; Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental 
Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-25, 
secs. 339–340, §§ 2027, 2021(a), 105 Stat. 75, 91–92; Veterans’ Benefits Act 
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-568, sec. 506(a), §§ 2021–2027, 106 Stat. 4320, 4340; 
USERRA, Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (1994); Veterans’ Benefits 
Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-275, 110 Stat. 3322; Veterans 
Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, 112 Stat. 3315; 
Veterans Benefits and Health Care Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-419, 114 Stat. 1822; Veterans Benefits Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 
No. 108-454, 118 Stat. 3598; Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-389, 122 Stat. 4145; Veterans’ Benefits Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-275, 124 Stat. 2864; Act of Nov. 21, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-56, 125 
Stat. 711; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA 
FY 2012), Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). 
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to be used sparingly.33 The traditional obligations for RC members 
remained relatively stable: one weekend a month for drill and two weeks 
a year for annual training, with maybe one mobilization during the 
course of one’s career.34 In fact, less than one percent of the forces that 
were deployed during the Vietnam War were in the RC.35 The 
overwhelming majority of RC members only served the minimum; and 
the draft was used very sparingly to augment active duty strength as 
needed. 
In 1973, however, the draft era ended and the Total Force policy 
authorized the augmentation of enlisted and officer ranks of the Army, 
Navy (including the Marine Corps), and Air Force with the civilian RC 
part-timers.36 Under the Total Force policy and Department of Defense 
(DOD) Directive 1200.17, the RC was given increasing responsibility in 
every aspect of national security. It transitioned into an operational 
force in reserve rather than a strategic one of last resort.37 Under these 
policies, the RC trained longer and participated in additional (and 
longer) deployments.38 The goal was to have an integrated volunteer-
based system of troops under which the RC were frequently used on 
missions.39 Over time, this policy became even more critical as the  
33. U.S. Gen. Accounting Off., GAO-02-608, Reserve Forces: DOD 
Actions Needed to Better Manage Relations between 
Reservists and Their Employers 5 (2002) [hereinafter GAO-02-608]. 
34. Daniel J. Bugbee, Employers Beware: Violating USERRA Through 
Improper Pre-Employment Inquiries, 12 Chap. L. Rev. 279, 287 (2008); 
Susan M. Gates et al., Rand Corp., Supporting Employers in the 
Reserve Operational Forces Era: Are Changes Needed to 
Reservists’ Employment Rights Legislation, Policies, or 
Programs? 1 (2013). 
35. GAO-14-676, supra note 11, at 5 (reporting that only 0.4% of the 
servicemembers deployed during Vietnam were in the RC). 
36. 10 U.S.C. § 10102 (2012) (contains the RC’s statutory purpose); Assistant 
Sec’y of Def. for Reserve Affairs, DOD 1215.15-H, The Reserve 
Components of the United States Armed Forces 2 (1996); U.S. 
Gov’t. Accountability Off., GAO-07-259, Military Personnel: 
Additional Actions Needed to Improve Oversight of Reserve 
Employment Issues 9 (2007). 
37. H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, at 18–19 (1993); S. Rep. No. 103-158, at 39 
(1993); Dep’t of Def., Directive 1200.17, Managing the Reserve 
Components as an Operational Force (2008); Gates et al., supra 
note 34, at 1. 
38. H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, at 18–19; S. Rep. No. 103-158, at 39; see Bugbee, 
supra note 34, at 285–89; Gates et al., supra note 34, at 1. 
39. Universal Military Training and Service Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 90-
491, 82 Stat. 790 (1968); Ryan Wedlund, Citizen Soldiers Fighting 
Terrorism: Reservists’ Reemployment Rights: The Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployments Rights Act and Minnesota’s Military Leave 
Laws, 30 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 797, 803 (2004). 
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congressionally authorized strength numbers for enlisted and officer 
ranks were reduced, and the overall military budget diminished.40 As a 
result, the use of the RC in the modern force structure has significantly 
expanded over the years, and “no significant operation” today is done 
without it.41 
The first time the Total Force policy really came into play was 
during the Gulf War-Era I. During Operation Desert Storm in 1990–
1991, between 200,000 and 225,000 RC members were deployed.42 This 
represented about sixteen percent of the total forces deployed during 
the era, a much larger percentage of total troops than in prior con-
flicts.43 In addition to the RC, most of the regular forces enlisted and 
officers who were activated left full-time civilian employment at the 
time of their orders to active duty.44 In response to the experiences of 
these large numbers of activated servicemembers, Congress rewrote the 
law governing employment protections at work for this community. 
With this 1994 rewrite, Congress both reaffirmed the law’s national 
security purpose and clarified it further by breaking into three 
components. First, Congress hoped “to encourage noncareer service” in 
the military “by eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian 
careers and employment which can result from such service.”45 Second, 
USERRA was meant “to minimize the disruption to the lives of persons 
performing service . . . by providing for the prompt reemployment of 
such persons upon their completion of such service . . . .”46 Third,  
40. Brian Clauss & Marcy Karin, 1-2 Servicemember and Veterans Rights 
§ 2.01[1] (2016), LexisNexis (“As defense budgets continue to be cut, [the 
RC] will carry more of the burden because they are the most cost-effective 
personnel in the Armed Forces.”). 
41. GAO-02-608, supra note 33, at 5. 
42. Konrad S. Lee et al., Emerging Limitations of the Uniformed Services 
Employment and Reemployment Act, 55 Loy. L. Rev. 23, 25 (2009) (citing 
Stephen M. Duncan, Gulf War Was a Test of Reserve Components and They 
Passed, in The U.S. Naval War Coll., Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
Employment or Reserve Component: Extracts of Lessons Learned 
21, 21 (1991)); Michele A. Forte, Reemployment Rights for the Guard and 
Reserve: Will Civilian Employers Pay the Price for National Defense?, 59 
A.F. L. Rev. 287, 294 (2007). 
43. GAO-14-676, supra note 11, at 5. The RC was about forty-five percent of 
the Total Forces available for deployment. Legislation Relating to 
Reemployment Rights, Educational Assistance, and the U.S. Court of 
Veterans Appeals: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 102nd 
Cong. 151 (1991) (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston). 
44. Hearing Before S. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, supra note 43 (about 
eighty-six percent of enlisted and ninety percent of officers who deployed 
had full time jobs when they received their orders). 
45. USERRA, Pub. L. No. 103-353, § 4301, 108 Stat. 3149, 3150 (1994).  
46. Id. 
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USERRA was designed “to prohibit discrimination against persons 
because of their service in the uniformed services.”47 Thus, USERRA 
(and its predecessors) recognized the need to balance the national 
security purpose with the needs of our servicemembers to reintegrate 
into civilian work after service is complete, despite any corresponding 
disruptions that civilian employers may face by a fluctuating military 
strength.48 
As the military moved from a draft-based to volunteer militia, and 
especially under the Total Force policy, “encourag[ing] noncareer 
service” became the most important goal.49 As others have observed, 
the military has “struggled to meet recruitment goals” after the 
changing operational tempo under the Total Force policy, and trouble 
with work “associated with the transition into and out of part-time 
military service may be contributing to the problem.”50 USERRA was 
a direct response to the experiences with this new normal of operational 
tempo, and it was created “explicitly to induce citizens to enlist in the 
national reserve”51 and “address the new realities of [the] military 
[strength] policy.”52 Today’s new reality is that America needs people 
to serve, and more than that, to volunteer to do so. The belief is that 
people will not do so—or will not volunteer to reenlist—unless their 
pre-service, full-time jobs are protected and reintegration into civilian 
life is smooth.53 Thus, this “assurance of clearcut and unqualified rights 
to reemployment without penalty . . . [for t]hose who answer the call 
to their Nation’s colors” is critical.54 Further, recruitment and  
47. Id. 
48. See Stephen D. Tandle, Military Service and Private Pension Plan Benefits: 
An Analysis of Veterans’ Reemployment Rights, 58 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 167, 
167 (1981) (observing that reemployment rights were included in 1940 “to 
prevent widespread unemployment like that which had followed World War 
I”). 
49. Lee et al., supra note 42, at 24. 
50. Id. at 25. 
51. Anita Silvers & Leslie Pickering Francis, A New Start on the Road Not 
Taken: Driving with Lane to Head Off Disability-Based Denials of Rights, 
23 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 33, 87 (2007) (citing USERRA § 4301(a)(1)). 
52. Andy P. Fernandez, The Need for the Expansion of Military Reservists’ 
Rights in Furtherance of the Total Force Policy: A Comparison of the 
USERRA and ADA, 14 St. Thomas L. Rev. 859, 868 (2002) (observing 
that prior legislation was “geared toward employment protection of the 
conscription based force management policies”). 
53. Samuel F. Wright, Is Injunctive Relief Available in a USERRA Case?, 
Serv. Members L. Ctr.: L. Rev. 200 (Oct. 2005), https://www. 
servicemembers-lawcenter.org/LAW_REVIEW_200.html [https://perma.cc 
/58HN-H9CQ]. 
54. Legislation Relating to Reemployment Rights, Educational Assistance, and 
the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
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continuation of service in the RC in particular will be impacted if people 
“lack confidence that their USERRA rights will be respected or 
enforced . . . .”55 Thus, in 1994, USERRA codified a unique mix of 
protections for eligible employees and applicants who choose to serve 
in the military and need to step away from civilian responsibilities to 
complete that service.56 
These rights govern virtually all employers, public or private, re-
gardless of size or location (here or abroad).57 In so doing, Congress 
transferred some of the costs of taking care of those people that do sign 
up to serve the country to the employer community. As a result, 
covered employers are subject to a mix of obligations that offer eligible 
employees a protection from discrimination based on military status, 
an anti-retaliation provision, and three unique labor standards that 
offer a right to reemployment without penalty due to service.58 Each of 
these core provisions is described below. 
A. USERRA’s Protections from Discrimination and Retaliation 
USERRA contains unique anti-discrimination protections. Under 
38 U.S.C. § 4311, employers may not discriminate against certain 
people in the “initial employment, reemployment, retention in em-
ployment, promotion, or a benefit of employment . . . [on the basis of 
that] membership, application for membership, service, application for 
service, or [service] obligation.”59 Generally, eligibility for these pro-
tections applies to “any person employed by an employer” who volun-
tarily or involuntarily “is a member of, applies to be a member of, 
performs, has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to 
 
Veterans Affairs, 102nd Cong. 10 (1991) (statement of Stuart E. Schiffer, 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Division, Department of Justice). 
55. S. Rep. No. 110-449, at 24 (2008). 
56. USERRA, Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (1994). 
57. See id. § 4303(4) (defining “employer” to include private persons, institutions, 
and organizations; the federal government; and state governments); 20 C.F.R. 
§ 1002.34 (2016) (explaining that USERRA covers employers in the United 
States and certain foreign employers). There are some federal agencies that 
work on national defense that are exempt. 
58. See Marcy Karin & Robin Runge, Breastfeeding and a New Type of 
Employment Law, 63 Cath. L. Rev. 329 (2014) (describing the difference 
between labor standards and anti-discrimination protections). USERRA also 
provides the ability to continue health-care benefits for up to two years after 
leaving for active duty. See USERRA § 4317(a) (describing these health-care 
benefit protections); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.164 (2016) (same); see also USERRA 
§ 4318(a)(2)(A) (describing other protections related to benefits that must be 
afforded); 20 C.F.R. §§ 1002.259–1002.260 (2016) (same). 
59. USERRA § 4311(a); 20 C.F.R. §§ 1002.18–1002.19 (2016). 
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perform service in a uniformed service . . . .”60 Moreover, unlike other 
federal employment laws, USERRA does not have an employee thres-
hold number that triggers coverage or contain a length of service re-
quirement. In practice, this means that everyone in the protected class 
is covered, and should be free from workplace discrimination on the 
basis of military obligations. 
This was not always the case, however. The anti-discrimination 
protection evolved piecemeal over time to complement the reem-
ployment rights discussed in the next Section. The first three versions 
of the law were silent as to discrimination. Beginning with the fourth 
iteration of the law, in 1951, employers were required to retroactively 
grant a leave of absence to someone who applied for, but was “rejected” 
by the military.61 Although this protection was phrased as an 
affirmative standard that employers had to do (reemploy rejected 
military applicants), the underlying goal was to ensure that employers 
would not discriminate against someone who would have served had he 
been able to do so.62 Given this, Congress believed that solely being a 
member of the class of workers that was rejected from service should 
not be the basis of an adverse employment action. 
A few years later, stories of RC members experiencing dis-
crimination on the basis of their regular weekend drill and summer 
training duty began to surface.63 This negative press impacted the mi-
litary’s ability to convince people separating from regular active duty 
to transition into the RC.64 In response, Congress amended the law in 
1968 to protect RC members from discrimination “because of any obli-
gation as a member of a reserve component.”65 In 1980, another  
60. USERRA §§ 4303(3), 4311(a). The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Response Act of 2002 included certain disaster response work (including 
service in the Public Health Service commissioned corps and authorized 
training for such work) as “service in the uniformed services.” Public Health 
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-188, sec. 102, § 2811(e)(3)(A), 116 Stat. 594, 602; see USERRA 
§ 4303(13) (defining “service in the uniformed services”); Other Workplace 
Standards: Reemployment and Nondiscrimination Rights for Uniformed 
Services Members, Employment Law Guide, U.S. Dep’t of Labor 
(Sept. 2009), https://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/elg/userra.htm 
[https://perma.cc/DX7F-5PNM] (describing USERRA coverage and the 
inclusion of work under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Act of 
2002 as “service in the uniformed services”). 
61. Universal Military Training and Service Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 82-
51, sec. 1, § 9(g)(3), 65 Stat. 75, 86–87 (1951). 
62. S. Rep. No. 82-117, at 70 (1951). 
63. Crotty, supra note 24, at 175. 
64. Id. 
65. Universal Military Training and Service Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 90-
491, § 9(c)(3), 82 Stat. 790, 790 (1968); S. Rep. No. 90-1477, at 2 (1968).  
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amendment prevented employers from basing a hiring decision on one’s 
status of being a RC member.66 Then, in 1986, Congress expanded the 
provision again to protect applicants from all workplace discrimination 
on the basis of one’s status of being a RC member or because of any 
obligation that flows from that status.67 Congress observed that 
protection against discrimination in hiring was needed as a corollary to 
the right to reemployment for those who did not have a job before 
service, but “who need[ed] jobs [now].”68 
Then, with USERRA in 1994, an explicit, expanded discrimination 
provision was enacted. Specifically, Congress expanded the 
discrimination protection beyond membership in only the RC to anyone 
applying for, being, or who previously was a part of uniformed service—
and Congress applied that anti-discrimination protection without 
regard to the actual performance of service.69 Subsequent expansions of 
the law clarified that employers may be liable for the failure to provide 
equal pay due to military status and for a hostile work environment.70 
Further, USERRA includes an anti-retaliation provision. Under 
this provision, employers may not retaliate against a person who en-
forces a USERRA right, testifies, or otherwise assists in an invest-
igation.71 USERRA offers this protection from retaliation to someone  
66. Veterans' Rehabilitation and Education Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-466, sec. 511, § 2024, 94 Stat. 2171, 2207.  
67. Veterans’ Benefits Improvement and Health-Care Authorization Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-576, sec. 331, § 2021(b)(3), 100 Stat. 3248, 3279.  
68. See Vietnam Veterans’ Readjustment: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Veterans’ Affairs, 96th Cong. 1494–95 (1980) (statement of Dennis R. Wyant, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Labor for Veterans’ Employment) (explaining 
that the goal of this proposal was to make sure that RC members “who need 
jobs” were protected in hiring decisions in the same way that the reinstatement 
provision protected returning RC members). 
69. 140 Cong. Rec. 24,425 (1994). 
70. Act of Nov. 21, 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-56, sec. 251, § 4303(2), 125 Stat. 711, 
729; see also 157 Cong. Rec. 17,568 (2011) (observing that the compromise 
agreement adopts the House language clarifying the existence of hostile work 
environment claims). In 2011, the Fifth Circuit issued the first circuit court 
opinion on whether USERRA authorized a hostile work environment claim. 
The court decided that a right to be free from workplace harassment on the 
basis of military service was not a “benefit of employment.” Carder v. Cont’l 
Airlines Inc., 636 F.3d 172, 178–83 (5th Cir. 2011). The DOL suggested that 
Congress fix this in its annual report and Congress did so. See U.S. Dep’t 
of Labor, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment 
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) Fiscal Year 2010 Annual Report 
to Congress 18–19 (2011) (containing the recommendation); VOW to Hire 
Heroes Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-56, sec. 251, § 4303(2), 125 Stat. 711, 
729 (containing the legislative fix). 
71. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 
(USERRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b) (2012); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.19 (2016).  
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regardless of whether the employee has any past or current military 
connection, and irrespective of the character of service of anyone who 
did serve.72 
B. USERRA’s Labor Standards 
Although the discrimination protections described in the last 
Section currently underlie about half of the USERRA claims that are 
brought today, the heart of the law remains its three labor standards.73 
The first labor standard derives from the original 1940 resolution and 
provides a federal right to job-protected leave for military service.74 The 
second standard was created to give strength to the first by ensuring 
that returning servicemembers would not be fired, except for cause, for 
a period of time tied to the length of their service.75 The third standard 
requires employers to take reasonable efforts to help someone return to 
work.76 The rest of this Section elaborates on these standards. 
The first labor standard is the right to reemployment at an es-
calator position for up to five years (or longer). It derives from two 
elements of the original 1940 resolution. The first required private em-
ployers to “restore [any person who leaves a position other than a 
temporary one] to such position or to a position of like seniority, status 
and pay unless the employer’s circumstances have so changed as to 
make it impossible or unreasonable to do so.”77 The second required 
that “[a]ny person who is restored to [such] a position . . . shall be so 
restored without loss of seniority, insurance participation or benefits, or 
other benefits, and such person shall not be discharged from such 
 
72. USERRA § 4311(b). 
73. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, USERRA FY 2014 Annual Report to 
Congress 13 (2015), https://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/USERRA 
_Annual_FY2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3Y9-3X25]. 
74. USERRA § 4312. 
75. Id. § 4316(c)(1)–(2). 
76. Id. § 4313(a)(3). 
77. S.J. Res. 286, 76th Cong., § 3(b) (1940). This affirmative defense was designed 
to be a “very limited exception.” H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, at 25 (1993). It is 
available only when “a useless job” would need to be created or if there was 
a reduction in the force “that reasonably would have included the veteran.” 
Id. at 25 (quoting Davis v. Halifax Cty. Sch. Sys., 508 F. Supp. 966, 968 
(E.D.N.C. 1981) (“[I]t [is also not] a sufficient excuse that another person has 
been hired to fill the position vacated by the veteran nor that no opening 
exists at the time of application.”)); see also S. Rep. No. 103-158, at 46–54 
(1993) (discussing the requirements of the affirmative defense). Impossibility 
and unreasonableness remain affirmative defenses to reemployment today; the 
employer retains the burden of proof for these. USERRA § 4312(d)(1)(A) 
(2012); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.139(a) (2016); see also Forte, supra note 42, at 313 
(observing that these defenses are to be “narrowly construed”). 
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position without cause within one year after such restoration.”78 These 
requirements remain the central elements of the law, although they also 
have evolved over the years. 
Today, a qualified servicemember has the right to return to his or 
her pre-service job as adjusted by the escalator position. As first artic-
ulated by the Supreme Court in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair 
Corp.,79 the escalator position is “the precise point he would have 
occupied had he kept his position continuously during the war.”80 The 
Court later restated the principle in Oakley v. Louisville & Nashville R. 
Co.81 as the right to be restored “to a position which, on the moving 
escalator of terms and conditions affecting that particular employment, 
would be comparable to the position which he would have held if he 
had remained continuously in his civilian employment.”82 In 1948, 
Congress adopted this concept. In this early version, a returning 
servicemember was granted the right to return to work at the job the 
person would be at but for service, with reasonable certainty, provided 
he was able to perform the relevant duties.83 
In 1948, Congress also created an exception for servicemembers who 
could not perform the relevant duties of an escalator position because 
of a disability obtained during service.84 In that situation, if the person 
was not able to return to the escalator position, he was given a right to 
return to the nearest similar position for which he could perform the 
duties.85 This provision was expanded in 1974 to all returning personnel; 
it was no longer just for those with a service-connected disability.86 
Today, all covered employees retain the right to return to the escalator 
position, and if he or she is no longer qualified for that position, the 
servicemember must be returned to his or her pre-service position or, if 
not qualified for that, the nearest approximation of the escalator or pre-
service position (in that order) for which the person is or can become 
 
78. S.J. Res. 286, § 3(c).  
79. 328 U.S. 275 (1946). 
80. Id. at 284–85; see also Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40 (1947) 
(affirming the escalator position principle). 
81. 338 U.S. 278, 283 (1949). 
82. Id. at 283. 
83. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, §§ 9(b)(A)(i), 9(b)(B)(i), 
62 Stat. 604, 614–15. 
84. Id. §§ 9(b)(A)(ii), 9(b)(B)(ii). 
85. Id. 
86. VRAA, Pub. L. No. 93-508, sec. 404, § 2021, 88 Stat. 1578, 1594–96 (1974). 
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qualified.87 If someone is not able to return to the escalator job, the 
alternative position must have similar seniority, status, and pay.88 
In addition to the right to work at one’s escalator position (or the 
closest one for which the person is qualified), he or she must be re-
employed with the rights and benefits based on seniority and length of 
service that the employee would have had with “reasonable certainty” 
but for the absence.89 According to the legislative history, this means 
that the person must have been very likely to receive the right or ben-
efit.90 Further, there may not be any loss of seniority when someone is 
reemployed.91 This includes within-grade increases, promotions, tenure, 
retirement, annual leave accrual, accrued vacation, severance pay, and 
similar benefits.92 For these seniority-related benefits, the person must 
be treated as if he or she never left. 
With respect to non-seniority benefits, such as life insurance and 
bonuses, the person must be granted whatever is given to similarly 
situated employees on non-military leave. If different benefits are given 
to various types of leave, the person must be given the most favorable 
treatment among the options.93 In 1975, the Supreme Court held that 
a benefit that is granted as compensation for work performed, including 
the accumulation of leave if it is tied to hours worked, is not related to 
seniority status.94 
In addition to the right to reemployment at an escalator position 
with all accrued benefits, USERRA created a rare statutory exception 
to employment-at-will with its second labor standard. Generally, under 
the doctrine of at-will employment, a person may be hired or fired by 
 
87. USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4313 (2012); 20 C.F.R. §§ 1002.196–1002.197 (2016). 
88. USERRA § 4313. Status generally refers to rank, advancement oppor-
tunities, responsibilities, work conditions, location, and shift assignment. 
H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, at 31 (1994) (further observing that “[s]ince 
seniority and pay are easily determined, the critical factor for determining 
equivalency is status”). 
89. USERRA § 4312. 
90. H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, at 31 (1993) (“The Committee intends to affirm the 
interpretation of ‘reasonable certainty’ as ‘a high probability’, which has 
sometimes been expressed in percentages . . . [such as examples where courts 
found that eighty-six and ninety percent met the required level of certainty].” 
(citations omitted)). 
91. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 9(b), 62 Stat. 604, 615.  
92. Universal Military Training and Service Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 87-
391, sec. 3, § 9(g)(4), 75 Stat. 821, 821 (1961). 
93. USERRA § 4316(b); 20 C.F.R. § 1002.150 (2016).  
94. Gates et al., supra note 34, at 16 (citing Foster v. Dravo Corp., 420 U.S. 
92, 99–100 (1975)). 
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an employer for any or no reason.95 By contrast, under USERRA, a 
returning servicemember must be given a period of time after 
reemployment to readjust, during which he or she only may be fired for 
cause. Essentially, if someone has engaged in covered military duty for 
at least thirty days, he or she is entitled to a period of time back at 
work (either 180 days or a year depending on the length of service) 
where termination is only possible for cause.96 Cause has been defined 
as something that is “reasonable under the circumstances, not arbitrary, 
and . . . that the servicemember was on notice would constitute 
grounds for discharge.”97 The employer bears the burden of proving that 
a discharge during the relevant time frame is for cause.98 
This second labor standard (the exception to at-will employment) 
gives teeth to the first (the reemployment requirement). Preventing 
someone from being terminated without cause allows the returning 
servicemember to have a chance to fully reintegrate, relearn civilian 
skills, and have some economic stability after separating from service.99 
It prevents employers from “perfunctory and meaningless re-
instatement”100 that would allow employers to fire a servicemember a 
day after he or she was reemployed.101 Put differently, it “guard[s] 
 
95. James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau: Conscience and At-Will Employment, 9 
U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 235, 235 (2007) (observing that at-will employ-
ment has prevailed “in forty-nine states [the exception being Montana] and 
the District of Columbia” for over 100 years). 
96. USERRA § 4316(c)(1)–(2). 
97. John F. Beasley Jr. & Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Reemployment Rights for 
Noncareer Members of the Uniformed Services: Federal and State Law 
Protections, 20 Lab. Law. 155, 164 (2004). 
98. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.248 (2016). 
99. See G. H. Fischer, Annotation, Re-employment of Discharged Servicemen, 29 
Am. L. Rep. 2d 1279, § 4 (1953) (“It has been very aptly stated that the act 
was designed to provide for the rehabilitation of the returning veteran so that 
he might be equipped to enter a highly competitive world of job finding 
without the handicap of a long absence from work, as well as to provide for 
his financial stability . . . .”). 
100. 139 Cong. Rec. 27,141 (1993) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller). 
101. See 86 Cong. Rec. 10,445 (1940) (statement of Rep. O’Toole) (“Mr. 
Chairman, . . . [we need to] prevent an employer from reemploying a man for 
1 day or 1 week and then dismissing him and saying that he had complied 
with the law. [We also need to prevent] . . . the various districts [from 
making] . . . different decisions, some saying that 1 day is a sufficient 
compliance, some saying 2 weeks, and some 1 week, and we will have a 
different law in every section of the country. To avoid this, and to make up 
for the sacrifice these men have made and to penalize those employers who 
would like to disobey the law, I think we should make it compulsory with the 
employer to take these men back for a period of 6 months, and if they are 
taken back for 6 months, in 99 cases out of 100 they will be there for good.”). 
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against a bad faith or pro forma reinstatement”102 and prevents a 
servicemember from being penalized “by reason of his [or her] ab-
sence.”103 
USERRA’s third labor standard involves reasonable accommo-
dations. In 1991, after the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA),104 the law was changed to require employers to provide 
reasonable accommodations to assist people who develop a service-
related injury or have an injury that is aggravated by service to re-
qualify for work at the appropriate escalator or pre-service position.105 
In an effort to more closely resemble the reasonable accommodation 
provisions found in other disability laws, Congress included “improved 
reemployment rights for disabled veterans” by declaring that “a person 
shall be considered qualified to perform the duties of an employment 
position if such person, with or without reasonable accommodation, can 
perform the essential functions of the position.”106 The new provision 
also created an affirmative duty on employers to provide reasonable 
accommodations unless doing so would impose an “undue hardship” on 
operations.107 
The 1991 law also created an accommodation plus requirement. 
Under this provision, employers must make “reasonable efforts” to 
reemploy someone at his or her escalator position and to help them re-
qualify for their pre-service job or to perform the duties of the next 
closest position.108 Thus, the law imposed an affirmative obligation on 
employers to take steps to (re)train someone to become qualified for 
the post-service job in the escalator position regardless of whether 
someone has a disability. With the accommodation plus provision, 
USERRA goes much further than traditional accommodation doctrine 
 
102. H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, at 35 (1993).  
103. Fischer, supra note 99, § 4. 
104. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012)). 
105. USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4313(a)(3) (2012). 
106. Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-25, sec. 339, § 2027, 105 Stat. 75, 91–92 (“[T]he 
terms ‘reasonable accommodation’ and ‘undue hardship’ have the meanings 
given such terms in [the ADA] (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 (9) and (10)).”); see also 
1 Defense of Equal Employment Claims § 8:14 (2016), Westlaw 
(explaining that the USERRA version of this provision was drafted to respond 
to “a controversy [that] arose [under VRAA] regarding whether an employer’s 
duty to accommodate leave for military service was subject to any 
reasonableness requirement or exception for undue hardship”). 
107. Secs. 339–340, 105 Stat. at 91–92.  
108. Id.; see USERRA § 4313(a)(4) (current language of the requirement). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 1·2016 
"Other Than Honorable" Discrimination 
154 
by affirmatively requiring employers to help someone become qualified 
for the job.109 
Accordingly, while a person must be qualified for the civilian job to 
which he or she returns, USERRA requires an employer to make 
“reasonable efforts” to qualify someone for that position.110 In addition, 
the cost of such efforts is imposed on the employer.111 In determining 
whether the employer has met its obligation, courts will view the facts 
through the lens of Fishgold, in which the Court held that the labor 
standards for this community should be “liberally construed for the 
benefit of those who left private life to serve their country in its hour 
of great need.”112 Nonetheless, despite liberal construction, the person 
still must be qualified for the job under either of USERRA’s 
accommodation standards. If a person is not qualified, even after an 
employer’s reasonable efforts, he or she must be reemployed in a 
position of equivalent seniority, status, and pay to the escalator position 
(provided the person is qualified or able to become qualified to perform 
the job’s essential functions with the employer’s reasonable efforts).113 
If this is not possible, the employer must employ the person in the 
closest approximate position that the person is qualified for, which may 
be higher or lower, as determined on a case-by-case basis.114 
There is no question that USERRA and its predecessors have 
helped countless servicemembers reintegrate into civilian employment 
over the years with these reemployment protections. Unlike the dis-
crimination and retaliation provisions described above, however, the 
labor standards are not accessible to everyone who otherwise belongs 
to the protected class. Rather, access to these labor standards is granted  
109. See Understanding Your Employment Rights Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA): A Guide for Veterans, U.S. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/ 
ada_veterans.cfm [https://perma.cc/3F4F-HNAH] (last visited Oct. 24, 
2016) (“Under USERRA, employers must make ‘reasonable efforts’ to help 
a veteran who is returning to employment to become qualified to perform 
the duties of the position . . . .”); James Schmeling, Veterans, Disability, and 
Employment, 31 GPSolo 28, 29 (2014) (noting that USERRA requires 
employers to “assist veterans in their reemployment to become qualified for 
their former job or other jobs”); Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans 
and Disability Law, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1081, 1109–10 (2010) 
(demonstrating how “USERRA expressly move[d]” beyond the ADA, by 
requiring employers to help an employee qualify for a job); Beasley Jr. & 
Pagnattaro, supra note 97, at 168 (providing examples of situations that 
would qualify as causes of action under one but not the other of these laws). 
110. USERRA § 4313(a)(1)(B). 
111. 20 C.F.R. § 1002.198(b) (2016). 
112. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946). 
113. USERRA § 4313(a). 
114. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 1002.225 (2016). 
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for uniformed servicemembers only if five conditions are met.115 First, 
the person must have left a civilian employer.116 Second, the service-
member must have given appropriate notice of the call to service unless 
military necessity prevented such notice from being provided.117 Third, 
the person must be absent for no more than five years of cumulative 
time.118 Fourth, the servicemember must return to the civilian employer 
in a timely manner.119 Finally, the person must be separated from 
service with honorable or general conditions, i.e., they must have the 
right character of service.120 This last requirement has the unintended 
consequence of excluding a large segment of Gulf War-Era II 
servicemembers who have a service-connected injury, who have ex-
perienced military sexual trauma, or who have caregiving respon-
sibilities. The next Part explains how and offers a proposal to amend 
USERRA’s labor standards to live up to the law’s intent. 
 
115. See USERRA §§ 4304, 4312. 
116. See id. § 4312(a)(3) (reemployment with an employer); id. § 4303(4) 
(definition of employer). 
117. Id. § 4303(8) (defining notice); id. § 4312(a)(1) (stating that advance notice 
of need for military leave is required for reemployment). Notice is not 
necessary if it would be impossible or unreasonable to give it under the 
circumstances. Id. § 4312(b). 
118. Id. § 4312(a)(2). In practice, coverage is often extended for much longer than 
five years as various types of service common during Gulf War-Era II do not 
count toward the cap. Id. § 4312(c). For example, active duty that is extended 
involuntarily is excluded. Id. § 4312(c)(4). See Full Committee Consideration 
of H.R. 11,509, to Amend and Clarify the Reemployment Provisions of the 
Universal Military Training and Service Act, and for Other Purposes: 
Hearing Before the H. Armed Services Comm., 76th Cong. 5 (1966) (noting 
this protection was added “during the Berlin crisis”). Annual training, regular 
drill, and presidential activations are similarly excluded. USERRA 
§ 4312(c)(3)–(4); 140 Cong. Rec. 24,421 (1994) (joint explanatory 
statement) (listing seven extensions to the cap in service). 
119. See USERRA § 4312(e)(1). In 1940, people had forty days to reapply. S.J. 
Res. No. 286, 76th Cong. § 3 (1940). Four years later, the requirement to 
provide notice within forty days was changed to ninety days. Selective 
Training and Service Act of 1940 Amendment, Pub. L. No. 78-473, 58 Stat. 
798 (1944). Today, timely notice depends on how long the person was in 
uniformed service. USERRA § 4312(e) (containing different time frames for 
service under 31 days, from more than 30 days to less than 181 days, and 
for more than 180 days). 
120. USERRA § 4304. 
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II. Fixing the Broken Promise of USERRA for 
Servicemembers with “Other Than Honorable” 
Separations 
The discrimination protection and rights to labor standards de-
scribed in Part I are couched in national security and an accompanying 
promise that a person’s uniformed service in the military will not harm 
his or her ability to engage in post-service civilian work. Over the years, 
as military and workplace needs have changed, the law has evolved to 
live up to this promise by covering more servicemembers, seeking 
fairness and uniform application of the guaranteed protections, 
bolstering the effectiveness of existing protections, and studying the 
application of the law for oversight purposes including improving 
effective enforcement and informing future calls for reform. The time 
has come to revisit the law again to “eliminat[e] or minimiz[e] the 
disadvantages to civilian careers and employment which can result from 
such service[; and] . . . provid[e] for the prompt re-
employment . . . [upon] completion of such service”121 for people who 
have separated from the military with other than honorable (OTH) 
conditions. 
Accordingly, this Article offers a two-part proposal to amend 
USERRA to help it live up to its stated goals. First, it recommends 
eliminating the OTH coverage exclusion located in 38 U.S.C. § 3404(b). 
Second, it recommends improving the accommodation provisions for 
this population (and others) by extending the time frame by which 
employers must make reasonable efforts to qualify someone for a 
position past the day of reemployment. Instead of ending at the moment 
of reemployment, this Part of the proposal suggests that the time frame 
for this labor standard mirror the one found in the cause protection 
standard. In so doing, the Article offers a way to improve USERRA so 
it does not become just another way the country fails to live up to the 
promise of supporting those who volunteer to serve. 
A. Removing the Exclusion of People with OTH Separations Based on 
Gulf War-Era II Experiences 
As noted in Part I, USERRA generally has a broad coverage 
threshold. There are no exclusions for small businesses or part-time or 
seasonal workers; nor are there minimum employee threshold or hours-
worked requirements as there are for other federal employment laws.122 
Rather, USERRA applies to any person who serves in a uniformed 
 
121. Id. § 4301. 
122. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(ii) (2012) (requiring someone to have 
worked for 1250 hours in the past twelve months to be covered under the 
FMLA); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2012) (covering only employers with at 
least fifteen employees under the ADA). 
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service.123 While broad, this coverage is not unfettered. “Uniformed 
service” is a term of law, and Congress has defined it to include most—
but not all—military personnel in the Total Forces.124 Indeed, only some 
types and characters of service are covered for certain protections. This 
contravenes the national security goal and stated purpose of USERRA. 
As a preliminary matter, USERRA does offer some type of coverage 
to everyone applying to enter, currently in, or having already par-
ticipated in uniformed service.125 For example, the anti-discrimination 
and anti-retaliation provisions apply to people falling into all of those 
categories.126 This is not true for all of USERRA’s protections, however, 
as the law conditions a servicemember’s “entitlement to the benefits” 
of the labor standards on a certain character of service.127 Specifically, 
the labor standards terminate with: (1) a dishonorable or bad conduct 
discharge; (2) an other than honorable conditions (OTH) separation; 
(3) a dismissal by court-martial or presidential order in a time of war;128 
or (4) a dropping of a commissioned officer from the rolls.129 The second 
exclusion of people with OTH separations is particularly problematic in 
light of the experiences of Gulf War-Era II veterans. It is also contrary 
to USERRA’s long history of encouraging military service, of fairness, 
and of supporting people dealing with service-connected disabilities. 
 
123. USERRA § 4312(a) (“[A]ny person whose absence from a position of 
employment is necessitated by reason of service in the uniformed services 
shall be entitled to the reemployment rights and benefits.”); id. § 4303(3) 
(defining “employee” as “any person employed by an employer”). 
124. Id. § 4303(16) (“The term ‘uniformed services’ means the Armed Forces, the 
Army National Guard and the Air National Guard when engaged in active 
duty for training, inactive duty training, or full-time National Guard duty, 
the commissioned corps of the Public Health Service, and any other category 
of persons designated by the President in time of war or national 
emergency.”). 
125. Id. § 4311(a). 
126. Id. § 4311(a)–(b). 
127. Id. § 4304. 
128. The text references a dismissal per 10 U.S.C. § 1161(a), which covers 
commissioned officers dismissed by (1) “sentence of a general court-martial; 
(2) in commutation of a sentence of a general court-martial; or (3) in time 
of war, by order of the President.” USERRA § 4304. 
129. The text refers to people dropped from the rolls under 10 U.S.C. § 1161(b), 
which drops commissioned officers who have been AWOL for at least three 
months; sentenced by a court martial by a final sentence of more than six 
months; or been found guilty and sentenced to confinement by a non-military 
court. USERRA § 4304. 
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1. An Overview of OTH Separations 
At the end of military service, all living personnel are either 
punitively discharged or administratively separated from service.130 
Punitive discharges are the result of a court martial and are categorized 
as either dishonorable or bad conduct.131 All other discharges are the 
result of an administrative separation process. Through this process, 
someone may obtain an honorable, general under honorable conditions 
(general), OTH, or entry-level separation (ELS).132 Generally, OTH is 
a type of involuntary administrative separation that is meant to 
designate military service below an acceptable level.133  
130. The designation is included on someone’s DD-214, the form used to capture 
one’s character of service at the time of separation. DD Form 214, 
Discharge Papers and Separation Documents, National Archives 
https://www.archives.gov/st-louis/military-personnel/dd-214.html 
[https://perma.cc/9PW6-EY84] (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).  
 Servicemembers have fifteen years to apply for a discharge upgrade to receive 
a better separation status. See 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (2012) (stating that review 
of discharge or dismissal must be made within fifteen years); Dep’t of 
Defense, Instruction 1332.28, Discharge Review Board (DRB) 
Procedures and Standards (2004) (restating this requirement); Dep’t 
of Defense Form 293, Application for the Review of Discharge 
from the Armed Forces of the United States (2015) (same). 
Upgrades have a low success rate. See Michael Ettlinger & David F. 
Addlestone, Military Discharge Upgrading and Introduction to 
Veterans Administration Law: A Practice Manual ¶ 26.3.4.1 (2d ed. 
1990) (“The VA favorably adjudicates only about ten percent of these 
cases.”). 
 An upgraded discharge may entitle someone to USERRA protections 
retroactively, but it does not alleviate the need for the person to have timely 
reapplied for their job upon return. H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, at 37 (1993). 
Thus, with respect to USERRA, the upgrade only matters if it is done with 
enough time for the person to timely reapply for their job and if it is granted 
retroactively to the date of discharge as opposed to for benefits going forward 
from the date of the upgrade. H.R. Rep. No. 103-65, at 37. 
131. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, R.C.M. 1003(b)(8) 
(2012). 
132. The punitive discharges, OTH, and ELS are sometimes referred to as “bad 
papers.” ELS is only given to someone who is separating within the first six 
months of military service. David P. Price, Getting Fired by the Military 
(And What You Can Do About It), N.J. Law., June 2007, at 21, 22–23. 
133. The Secretary of Defense has the power to issue regulations; each service 
branch has been authorized by the Secretary to promulgate its own standards 
for OTH separations. For examples of the standards each branch has 
promulgated, see U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 
36-3208, Administrative Separation of Airmen (2015) [hereinafter AFI 
36-3208]; U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 635-200, Active Duty Enlisted 
Administrative Separations (2011); U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
U.S. Coast Guard, COMDTINST M1000.4, Military Separations 
(2016); U.S. Marine Corps, MCO P1900.16F, Separation and 
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While involuntary, OTH separations are discretionary, and 
administrative separation is virtually guaranteed for some forms of 
misconduct.134 This includes certain types of egregious misconduct or 
illegal drug abuse, while other types of misconduct and activity are 
truly on a discretionary basis.135 Unfortunately, there is no clear, 
uniform definition of what misconduct will result in an OTH discharge, 
and each military branch has separate guidance.136 For example, the Air 
Force authorizes an OTH separation for “a pattern of behavior or one 
or more acts or omissions that constitute a significant departure from 
the conduct expected of airmen.”137 By comparison, the Coast Guard 
authorizes OTH “for misconduct, security reasons or good of the 
Service.”138 While the guidance for each branch contains examples of 
what constitutes things like a “significant departure” from standards, 
the reality is that it generally remains at the discretion of command on 
a case-by-case basis.139  
Retirement Manual (2013); U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Naval Military 
Personnel Manual, art. 1900-1999 (2002). 
134. Price, supra note 132, at 23–24 (providing an overview of the discharge 
review process).  
135. See, e.g., U.S. Marine Corps, MCO P1900.16, Separation and 
Retirement Manual 1-15 (2013) (“Confirmed illegal drug use requires 
mandatory administrative separation processing.”); Price, supra note 132, at 
22–23 (“An OTH is most often issued for misconduct . . . [such as] drug 
abuse.”); John W. Brooker, Evan R. Seamone & Leslie C. Rogall, Beyond 
“T.B.D.”: Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former Servicemember’s 
Benefit Eligibility Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge from the 
Armed Forces, 214 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 18 (2012) (“Historically and modernly, 
the military's reliance on and deference to command discretion has produced 
inconsistent punishments.”). Until the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell Repeal Act of 
2010, concealing one’s homosexuality, lying about prior acts, or committing 
same-sex acts during service could have led to a mandatory OTH. See, e.g., 
U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 635-200, Active Duty Enlisted 
Administrative Separations (2011) (requiring all references to activity 
and prior concealment of homosexuality from the Army’s administrative 
separation regulation); see generally Karen Moulding et al., 1 Sexual 
Orientation and the Law § 8:19 (2016), Westlaw (discussing some historic 
military policies on homosexuality). 
136. See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.136 (2016) (“The branch of service in which the 
employee performs the tour of duty determines the characterization of 
service.”). 
137. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, Air Force Instruction 36-3208, 
Administrative Separation of Airmen 22 (2004); see U.S. Dep’t of 
the Navy, Naval Military Personnel Manual, art. 1910-304 (2008) 
(using substantially the same language as the Air Force). 
138. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, U.S. Coast Guard, 
COMDTINST M1000.4, Military Separations 1-62 (2015). 
139. Brooker et al., supra note 135, at 18 (“[T]here are no precise military 
standards dictating when these characterizations will result or for what types 
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These definitions—combined with an inconsistent application of 
them at the discretion of command—have resulted in a striking number 
of people receiving OTH separations during the recent conflicts. From 
October 2000 to September 2005, about six percent of separations, or a 
little over 55,000 people, separated from the military with an OTH 
designation.140 Another 20,000 people received OTH discharges from 
2005 to 2012.141 These are conservative figures, as some have estimated 
that over 100,000 OTH separations have occurred during the Gulf War-
Era II.142 
Obtaining an OTH characterization of service has a devastating 
impact on someone’s ability to successfully reintegrate into civilian life. 
An OTH separation may deny that person access to military health 
care, eliminate education benefits, remove access to military pensions, 
and force a person to forego a myriad of other benefits that were once 
promised to them.143 Importantly, an OTH separation significantly 
 
of offenses. Historically and modernly, the military’s reliance on and 
deference to command discretion has produced inconsistent punishments. 
Troops may be punished harshly with an OTH . . . in one battalion for the 
same misconduct that garners a counseling statement or corrective training 
50 yards away in a different battalion on the same installation.”); see Charles 
P. Sandel, Comment, Other-Than-Honorable Military Administrative 
Discharges: Time for Confrontation, 21 San Diego L. Rev. 839, 855 (1984) 
(“It is difficult to detect or protect against [command influence or abuse of 
discretion] within the existing discharge process.”). 
140. During this time, 945,596 people separated from the military. U.S. 
Veterans’ Disability Benefits Comm., Honoring the Call to Duty: 
Veterans’ Disability Benefits in the 21st Century 93 tbl.5.1 (2007) 
(25.2% of all people who separated from the military during this time frame 
possess discharges that disqualify them from USERRA’s labor standards) 
[hereinafter Honoring the Call to Duty]. 
141. Hal Bernton, Troubled Veterans Left Without Health-Care Benefits, 
Seattle Times (Aug. 11, 2012, 8:00 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/ 
seattle-news/troubled-veterans-left-without-health-care-benefits/ [https:// 
perma.cc/SUR5-FGUG]. 
142. Marisa Peñaloza & Quil Lawrence, Other-Than-Honorable Discharge 
Burdens Like a Scarlett Letter, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Dec. 9, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2013/12/09/249342610/other-than-honorable-
discharge-burdens-like-a-scarlet-letter [https://perma.cc/PA7C-C6RZ]. 
143. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 5303 (2012) (denying certain benefits based on OTH 
separation); Peter Slavin, The Cruelest Discrimination: Vets with Bad Paper 
Discharges, 14 Bus. & Soc. Rev. 25, 27–28 (1975) (providing examples of 
people who have had trouble finding work after bad papers, and further 
describing that the stigma associated with bad papers makes finding 
employment difficult, has a disproportionate effect on minority 
servicemembers, and makes it “harder, if not impossible, to obtain” other life 
necessities); Charles E. Lance, A Criminal Punitive Discharge—An Effective 
Punishment?, 79 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 20–21 (1978) (listing over twenty federal 
benefits that are denied to someone with a dishonorable discharge). 
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impacts employment opportunities as well. It makes reenlistment in the 
military impossible144 and attaches a strong stigma on the person that 
follows them to the civilian workplace.145 This stigma may result in a 
failure to be hired, or having an additional hurdle of “bad papers” to 
overcome.146 These bad papers are the death knell for some, as certain 
employers blacklist veterans that have them.147 Consequently, these 
“discarded troops” are forced to return to civilian life with “severe 
handicaps related to their discharge characterizations that prevent 
successful reintegration.”148 
Not surprisingly, studies have shown that these discarded troops 
run into trouble reintegrating. They “have a higher incidence of un-
employment, violent behavior, alcohol and drug abuse, family problems 
and homelessness than other veterans.”149 As a result, bad papers have 
been called “a life sentence” or a “ticket to America’s underclass [and] 
a bar to leaving it.”150 Thus, through the discharge process, the military 
removes access to some of the very protections to civilian employment 
 
144. 10 U.S.C. §§ 508(a), 3258, 8258. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 
601-210, Active and Reserve Components Enlistment Program 4-
4(d), 4-23(n) (2013) (OTH is a non-waivable disqualifying separation that 
prevents reenlistment in the RC.). 
145. See Stephen Losey, Military Must Do Right by Wrongly-Discharged Sexual 
Assault Victims, Advocates Say, Air Force Times (May 19, 2016, 5:53 
PM), https://www.airforcetimes.com/articles/military-must-do-right-by-
wrongly-discharged-sexual-assault-victims-advocates-say [https://perma.cc/ 
VM4M-QBTN] (observing that 85% of separations are honorable, “meaning 
anything else stands out to potential employers”); Slavin, supra note 143, 
at 27–38; Browning v. Gen. Motors Corp., Fisher Body Div., 387 F. Supp. 
985 (S.D. Ohio 1974). 
146. Slavin, supra note 143, at 27 (observing that many businesses “count their 
discharges against such veterans, or refuse to hire them entirely”). 
147. Id. at 29. 
148. Evan R. Seamone, Dismantling America’s Largest Sleeper Cell: The 
Imperative to Treat, Rather than Merely Punish, Active Duty Offenders with 
PTSD Prior to Discharge from the Armed Forces, 37 Nova L. Rev. 479, 
503–04 (2013); Gregg Zoroya, Troubled Troops in No-Win Plight, USA 
Today (Nov. 2, 2006, 8:39 AM), https://usatoday30. 
usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-11-01-troubled-troops_x.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/XM32-S256]; Lawrence M. Baskir & William A. Strauss, 
Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam 
Generation 160 (1978). 
149. Maxine Waters & Jonathan Shay, Heal the ‘Bad Paper’ Veterans, N.Y. 
Times (Jul. 30, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/30/opinion/ 
heal-the-bad-paper-veterans.html [https://perma.cc/EJ6L-U9YR]; Zoroya, 
supra note 148 (describing positions of Marine Corps defense attorneys who 
have witnessed the downward spiral faced by their discharged clients with 
untreated mental health conditions). 
150. Brooker et al., supra note 135, at 12 (citations omitted). 
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that are meant to encourage people to serve in the first place and are 
at the heart of the principle underlying the creation of USERRA. This 
is because one’s character of service designation is the key to accessing 
benefits post-separation, which end up being a critical component to 
whether one is able to successfully transition to civilian life. 
A particularly troubling aspect of this discharge designation process 
and impact of bad papers on reintegration has surfaced from the Gulf 
War-Era II separated veterans: many can trace the underlying 
misconduct to an injury sustained during service, a response to military 
sexual trauma, or the impact of service on caregiving responsibilities. 
The experiences of these groups of veterans are explored in the following 
Sections. 
2. Service-Connected Injuries and OTH Separations 
A large number of people who have served during Gulf War-Era II 
obtained OTH separations as a result of conduct undertaken in con-
nection with service-related injuries.151 The precise number of OTH 
separations that directly stem from conduct associated with service-
connected injuries is unknown. But there is strong evidence tying some 
of the signature injuries of the recent conflicts, like post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD)152 and traumatic brain injury (TBI),153 to misconduct 
 
151. Although the problem is particularly acute during Gulf War-Era II, it is not 
unique only to this period. During Vietnam, over 560,000 veterans received 
OTH separations “for such offenses as being absent without leave, using or 
selling drugs or assaulting their superiors.” Waters & Shay, supra note 149. 
Further, just under half of those veterans—estimates place it at 250,000—
suffered from PTSD (which had not yet been classified in the DSM). Id. 
152. PTSD stems “from a significant threatening event that leads to specific types 
of responses based on unwanted reminders of the real trauma or attempts to 
avoid similar trauma from happening again.” Brooker et al., supra note 135, 
at 251–52. The VA claims that eleven to twenty percent of OIF and OEF 
veterans experience PTSD. National Center for PTSD, How Common Is 
PTSD?, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, https:// 
www.ptsd.va.gov/public/PTSD-overview/basics/how-common-is-ptsd.asp 
[https://perma.cc/V9M5-F52L] (last visited Oct. 27, 2016) [hereinafter How 
Common Is PTSD?]. 
153. TBI is the result of bodily impact that damages the brain. “Based on the 
nature of the trauma . . . , physiological responses can influence the brain’s 
processing of information and the ability to regulate emotion. In some cases, 
TBI impairs judgment to the point where a person perceives nonexistent 
threats or lacks the ability to express rage, shock or grief in a socially 
acceptable manner.” Brooker et al., supra note 135, at 252. From 2000 to 
mid-2016, 352,619 servicemembers were diagnosed with TBI. Defense and 
Veterans Brain Injury Center, DoD Worldwide Numbers for TBI, Defense 
Centers of Excellence https://dvbic.dcoe.mil/dod-worldwide-numbers-
tbi [https://perma.cc/V557-3KTD] (last visited Oct. 27, 2016). 
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and involuntary OTH separations.154 For example, a 2010 study of 
Marines deployed in OEF and OIF found that someone with a PTSD 
diagnosis was “‘11.1 times more likely’” to receive an OTH separation.155 
In addition, approximately 31,000 OTH separations from fiscal years 
2001 to 2010 involved someone with a personality or adjustment 
disorder.156 Like described for PTSD below, these disorders are 
“characterized by individuals’ inflexible [and] socially inappropriate 
behaviors across diverse situations,” and have led to some of the 
misconduct underlying this type of discharge.157 Indeed, an “inescapable 
connection” between service-connected injuries and criminal behavior 
has been documented.158 
This is not surprising when the signature injuries are unpacked. 
Among other things, PTSD and TBI impact judgment and one’s ability 
to address stress.159 They may cause dissociative episodes (a period of 
time when a person experiences a flashback that causes him to think he 
is back in the environment where the original trauma occurred) or  
154. See Daniel Reidenberg & Natasha Shaikh, Making Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder a Priority: Saving Veterans from Suicide, 37 Nova L. Rev. 523, 
538 (citing Bernton, supra note 141) (“[W]hen PTSD is left untreated, it 
leads to the soldiers misbehaving, ultimately and inevitably resulting in an 
OTH discharge.”); Proposed Second Amended Complaint at 10, ¶ 37, 
Shepherd v. McHugh, No. 3:11-cv-00641, (D. Conn. Dec. 3, 2012) (stating 
that servicemembers were discharged because of misconduct that was 
symptomatic of undiagnosed PTSD); Price, supra note 132 (“There is a 
rebuttable presumption that any medical condition is incurred incident to 
service.”). “Too many service members receive an [OTH] discharge for 
reasons related to PTS or TBI. Since 2000, service members have reported 
138,197 PTS cases and 333,169 TBI cases with many more cases unreported. 
These troops are sometimes viewed as liabilities instead of being treated 
appropriately.” Governor O’Malley’s Plan for Veterans and Military 
Families, O’Malley for President (Nov. 9, 2015) (citations omitted), 
https://martinomalley.com/policy/veterans/ [https://perma.cc/ 
FBY9-8ULX]. 
155. Brooker et al., supra note 135, at 256 (quoting Robyn M. Highfill-McRoy et 
al., Psychiatric Diagnoses and Punishment for Misconduct: The Effects of 
PTSD in Combat-Deployed Marines, 10 BMC Psychiatry 1, 6 (2010)); 
Reidenberg & Shaikh, supra note 154, at 538. 
156. Melissa Ader et al., Veterans Legal Servs. Clinic, Jerome N. 
Frank Legal Servs. Org. at Yale Law School, Casting Troops 
Aside: The United States Military’s Illegal Personality Disorder 
Discharge Problem 2–3 (2012), https://www.law.yale.edu/ 
system/files/documents/pdf/Clinics/VLSC_CastingTroopsAside.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7R7K-HR38]. 
157. Id. 
158. Vanessa Baehr-Jones, A “Catch-22” for Mentally-Ill Military Defendants: 
Plea-Bargaining Away Mental Health Benefits, 204 Mil. L. Rev. 51, 51 
(2010). 
159. Brooker et al., supra note 135, at 251. 
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violent sleep-state acts (where someone does something during a “vivid 
nightmare” while sleeping or immediately after being awoken).160 Other 
behavior tied to these injuries includes thrill-seeking (where someone 
seeks the adrenaline rush they used to have in combat by engaging in 
dangerous activity), self-punishment (someone acts in hopes of being 
punished because he believes he deserves to suffer as a result of a 
traumatic event in which he feels that he should have saved or 
prevented an injury to another during war), and revenge acts (someone 
acts because they felt exploited by the military during combat).161 The 
conditions also cause a decrease in one’s ability to perform a job, which 
has caused servicemembers to fail to appear at work, to be late with 
their work, and to have outbursts while at work.162 This behavior is 
sometimes mistaken as laziness or a lack of motivation, when it actually 
may be caused by the inability to “concentrate or cognitively organize 
information.”163 Even though PTSD is often untreated, sometimes 
treatment itself may cause problems, particularly during a time of 
change in one’s medication or dosage. Some drugs or combinations of 
prescription medication have induced adverse reactions.164 
These behavioral impacts of combat-related PTSD, TBI, and other 
conditions have been connected to a wide range of actions that have 
been categorized as misconduct leading to an OTH separation.165 These 
behaviors include problems performing one’s job, drug and alcohol use 
(often undertaken as a form of self-medication),166 shirking of 
responsibilities or lashing out at colleagues, taking of unauthorized 
 
160. Id. at 253, 255 (citations omitted). 
161. Id. at 253–55. 
162. Id. at 255. 
163. Id. 
164. Id.  
165. See, e.g., Amanda Carpenter, Military Misconduct May Be Sign of PTSD, 
Wash. Times (Jan. 12, 2010), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/ 
2010/jan/12/misconduct-may-be-symptom-of-stress-disorder/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4TCC-LE3D] (citing a sober warning, in 2007, by mental health 
professionals within the DOD that “[t]he service may be discharging soldiers 
for misconduct when in fact they are merely displaying symptoms of 
[PTSD].”); Thomas J. Hetchler Jr. & Aaron E. Cook, Other-Than-Honorable 
Military Discharge: Ramifications and Remedies, Mich. B.J., Feb. 2015, at 
30, 32 (2015) (“In many cases, the very conduct that led to the [OTH] 
discharge was directly related to stress disorder and brain injuries incurred 
during combat.”). 
166. Self-medication is a “very common response” to PTSD in an effort to 
sleep or relax. Brooker et al., supra note 135, at 253; see Bernton, supra 
note 141 (quoting a San-Francisco-based legal services provider who 
estimates that it has helped hundreds of veterans who received OTH 
separations for one-time drug use). 
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leaves, going AWOL, desertion, or “impulsive” or “explosive rages” on 
others, all of which have been the conduct underlying OTH separ-
ations.167 
Take the hypothetical case of Sergeant Jane Smith, a member of 
the RC who was diagnosed with PTSD. Smith was honorably dis-
charged from a deployment to Iraq. Later, she failed a urinalysis test 
due to marijuana use while she was in drill status. The positive drug 
test led to an OTH separation.168 This experience is not limited to 
hypotheticals. Even a one-time use of marijuana may result in an OTH 
separation. Smith’s experience is also not unique with respect to the 
receipt of multiple separations from the military, only one of which may 
be on bad papers. Many servicemembers receive multiple separations 
from the military, only one of which may be on bad papers.169 As the 
Tootle case described in the introduction demonstrates,170 a bad 
discharge, even after a series of good ones, still makes someone ineligible 
for USERRA’s labor standards. 
Stories from the field also illustrate that a number of 
servicemembers have trouble and commit the OTH qualifying mis-
conduct only after returning to the states. For example, Chris Packley 
was a decorated Marine marksman who had flashbacks of a friend dying 
in Fallujah.171 Packley also received an OTH separation after smoking 
marijuana, which he did to deal with the images in his flashbacks.172 
This type of self-medicating after returning from deployment is 
common. Unfortunately, so is the receipt of an OTH as a result of act-
ivity related to self-medication. 
Staff Sergeant Eric James is another example of someone who self-
medicated after returning home. James served two tours of duty in Iraq 
 
167. Seamone, supra note 148, at 495–96 (citing Viewpoints on Veterans Affairs 
and Related Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and 
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 103rd Cong. 15 (1994) 
(testimony of Jonathan Shay, M.D., Ph.D.)); Bernton, supra note 141; 
Brooker et al., supra note 135, at 255. 
168. Jeremy R. Bedford, Eligibility for VA Disability Compensation and Health 
Care Benefits for Army National Guardsmen Discharged with an Other 
than Honorable Discharge, Army Law., July 2014, at 36, 36. 
169. Honoring the Call to Duty, supra note 140, at 90. 
170. Tootle v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 559 F. App’x 998, 998–99, 1002 (Fed. Cir. 
2014); see also Whisnant v. U.S. Postal Serv., 83 M.S.P.B. 588, at ¶ 3 
(1999) (“The appellant’s discharge from the uniformed service under other 
than honorable conditions terminated his right to benefits under 
USERRA . . . .”). 
171. Zoroya, supra note 148. 
172. Id.  
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as an Army sniper.173 He was diagnosed with a mental health disorder 
and a TBI caused by being in a Humvee that flipped over in an 
attack.174 He was caught drunk driving in 2011.175 An NPR investigation 
uncovered that, before this incident, James was told that “his 
experiences in Iraq were not too traumatic,” and his calls for help to 
military therapists related to depression and suicide were ignored.176 
The Army mistreated his service-connected medical condition when he 
returned home, yet he was separated with an OTH for this 
misconduct.177 Thankfully for James, the Army later removed the OTH 
discharge.178 Most are not that lucky. 
For example, Marine Sergeant Ryan Birrell was a drill instructor 
after he returned home from a second tour of duty where he received a 
Bronze Star with a combat heroism designation.179 After he returned to 
the States, Birrell was diagnosed with PTSD, “abused alcohol and 
methamphetamine,” and left his post without permission.180 For a 
period of time after this, he lived in Tijuana, even though he was ex-
periencing homelessness there, because the “streets [there] were kind of 
like being in Iraq.”181 Birrell received an OTH separation for being 
AWOL.182 
Other than Staff Sergeant James, if his discharge was upgraded 
with enough time for him to meet the timely notice requirement, none 
of these people—some of whom had citations for great service—are 
eligible for USERRA’s labor standards. These stories illustrate some of 
the problems with tying rights and benefits to the classification given 
when one separates from service. This connection has been 
characterized as a military misconduct catch-22.183 The military ac-
knowledges that PTSD, TBI, and other conditions are the root cause 
of certain misconduct, but then discharges members for that same  
173. Daniel Zwerdling, Missed Treatment: Soldiers with Mental Health Issues 
Dismissed for ‘Misconduct,’ Nat’l Pub. Radio (Oct. 28, 2015, 3:53 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2015/10/28/451146230/missed-treatment-soldiers-
with-mental-health-issues-dismissed-for-misconduct [https://perma.cc/ 
JC2H-RD8H]. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. (noting that the Army later gave James a medical retirement). 
179. Zoroya, supra note 148. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id.  
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misconduct.184 This military misconduct catch-22 makes reemployment 
and full reintegration into civilian life even harder.185 It also contravenes 
the very intent behind USERRA’s labor standards. 
3. Military Sexual Trauma and OTH Separations 
OTH separations also disproportionately impact servicemembers 
who have experienced military sexual trauma (MST). MST is the um-
brella term used to capture both sexual assault and sexual harassment 
that occurs during military service.186 It is a widely recognized problem 
in the military, especially for female servicemembers. Approximately 
fifteen percent of women that have served during Gulf War-Era II 
screened positive for MST at the VA.187 The overall numbers are even 
greater. Twenty-three percent of female servicemembers reported 
experiencing sexual assault in the military; another fifty-five percent of 
women reported experiencing sexual harassment of some form.188 Both 
types of MST may lead to PTSD and the associated symptoms, actions, 
and experiences with OTH separations that were described in the last 
Section.189 In fact, one study reports that about a third of women who 
served during Gulf War-Era II who have been diagnosed with PTSD 
also experienced MST.190 Moreover, MST itself, regardless of whether 
the servicemember has also been diagnosed with PTSD, has led to post-
 
184. Seamone, supra note 148, at 489 (citation omitted); Zoroya, supra note 148; 
Baskir & Strauss, supra note 148. 
185. See Stacey-Rae Simcox, Leticia Y. Florex & Mark D. Matthews, 
1-8 Servicemember and Veterans Rights § 8.03 (2016), LexisNexis 
(discussing the difficulty veterans with PTSD and TBI have with 
reintegration). 
186. Kelly H. Koo & Shira Maguen, Military Sexual Trauma and Mental Health 
Diagnoses in Female Veterans Returning from Afghanistan and Iraq: 
Barriers and Facilitators to Veterans Affairs Care, 25 Hastings 
Women’s L.J. 27, 29 (2014). 
187. Id. at 37. Reported MST rates are increasing. See, e.g., Brittany L. 
Salsburg, Serv. Women’s Action Network, Military Sexual 
Trauma: The Facts 1–2 (n.d.) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Fiscal 
Year 2009 Annual Report on Sexual Assault in the Military 
(2010)) (reporting an 11% increase in MST from FY 2008 to FY 2009). 
188. Thirty-eight percent of men also reported experiencing sexual harassment 
in the military. How Common Is PTSD?, supra note 152. Nat’l Def. 
Research Inst., Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment in the 
U.S. Military 9 (2014) (calculating the figure at one in twenty women 
experiencing sexual assault in the last year during service). 
189. How Common Is PTSD?, supra note 152. See Survivors Write In, Protect 
Our Defenders, http://www.protectourdefenders.com/ 
survivors-write-i/ [https://perma.cc/N8JS-8KAA] (last visited Dec. 27, 
2016) (sharing the experiences of MST survivors in their own words). 
190. Koo & Maguen, supra note 186, at 30. 
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discharge reintegration problems, including the use of alcohol and 
drugs.191 
Take for example the case of a Marine who went AWOL after being 
raped. She was given an OTH separation for her absence.192 Or someone 
who agrees to accept an OTH separation so she no longer has to interact 
with her perpetrator or his supporters who are all on orders in the same 
geographic area.193 Or Nicole Curdt, a Damage Control Firearm 
Apprentice in the Navy, who received an OTH for reporting a sexual 
assault and sexual harassment at the hands of her supervisor.194 The 
experiences of servicemembers like Curdt, who received OTH discharges 
as a form of retaliation for reporting MST, recently garnished some 
national attention. In response, Congress created a new crime under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice for a supervisor who retaliates against 
someone who reports MST.195 But the reality is that neither the creation 
of this new crime nor the attention that MST has received recently 
changes the fact that OTH separations are sometimes given to people 
as retaliation for reporting—or as a result of how the woman responds 
to her experiences with—MST. 
 
191. Id. at 30–31. 
192. Bernton, supra note 141. After this Article was submitted for publication, 
Human Rights Campaign published a comprehensive report sharing 
information from interviews with 270 MST survivors and offering insights 
into shared experiences, including the impact of bad papers on this 
community, among other things. Human Rights Watch, Booted: Lack 
of Recourse for Wrongfully Discharged US Military Rape 
Survivors (2016), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/ 
us0516_militaryweb_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AKD6-ZLBE].  
193. Thread: VA Refusing to Help MST Victim Because of a OTH Discharge, 
Veterans Benefits Network (Apr. 6, 2011, 11:59 AM) https:// 
vets.yuku.com/topic/56590/va-refusing-to-help-mst-victim-because-of-a-
oth-discharge#.vklk1k6rrsn [https://perma.cc/D2LH-QELD] (“I chose to 
take any discharge I could get just to get away from the abuse. If I had 
stayed I would have been continually forced to sleep, shower, and use the 
‘head’ with my attackers and the idea of going through this for another 6 
months scared me beyond belief. I couldn’t understand why this was 
happening to me. So finally I was off the ship.” (veteran on online forum 
describing his experience)). 
194. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 124–25, Cioca et al. v. Rumsfeld et al., No. 
1:11cv00151 (E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 2011); Francine Banner, Immoral Waiver: 
Judicial Review of Intra-Military Sexual Assault Claims, 17 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 723, 737 (2013). 
195. NDAA for Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. 113-66, § 1709, 127 Stat. 672, 962 
(2013); Annalee Grant, Retaliation Against Crime Victims Now a Criminal 
Offense, U.S. Army (Aug. 8, 2014), https://www.army.mil/article/ 
131471/Retaliation_against_crime_victims_now_a_criminal_offense 
[https://perma.cc/3ETP-4NBM]. 
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These stories reflect another group of servicemembers who are ex-
cluded from USERRA’s protection because of the OTH character of 
service designation. 
4. Caregiving and OTH Separations 
During Gulf War-Era II, caregivers whose arrangements are im-
pacted by military service have surfaced as another group that has been 
categorically denied USERRA coverage as a result of the OTH 
exclusion. Families do not disappear when someone volunteers to serve. 
Many servicemembers have familial responsibilities that continue 
during active duty. Over half of servicemembers care for dependents.196 
Forty-two percent of servicemembers care for children, and 6.4 percent 
are single servicemembers.197 To put this in context, in 2009, the Army 
had 85,000 single soldiers with dependents, and these numbers are 
rising.198 
The military’s move to increased reliance on the RC, which is an 
older force and has more members who are parents and single parents, 
compounds problems with caregiving responsibilities.199 In addition, the 
number of women serving, the type of service authorized, and the 
number of women separating from the military have all significantly 
increased during this era.200 Over time, this group of servicemembers  
196. Shelley MacDermid Wadsworth & Kenona Southwell, Military 
Family Research Inst. at Purdue Univ., Military Families: 
Extreme Work and Extreme ‘Work-Family’ 4 (2010), http:// 
workplaceflexibility.org/images/uploads/program_papers/wadsworth_-
_military_families.pdf [https://perma.cc/GD77-U2HF]. 
197. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Demographics 2014: Profile of the Military 
Community vi (2014), http://download.militaryonesource.mil/12038/MOS/ 
Reports/2014-Demographics-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/H32W-S2HR] 
[hereinafter Demographics 2014]. 
198. Nancy Mullane, Soldier Mom Arrested After Refusing to Deploy, Nat’l 
Pub. Radio: Around the Nation (Nov. 19, 2009, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120562850 
[https://perma.cc/K9N6-3TYZ]. 
199. Demographics 2014, supra note 197, at vi (noting that 9.2% of RC members 
are single parents compared to less than 5% of active duty members); 
Michael L. Shea, Navigating Legal Issues for Military Veterans, 
Leading Lawyers on Arguing Disability, Pension, and Other Claims 
Before the VA: Understanding the Legal Needs of Veterans, 
Active Duty Military, and Reservists 1 (2013), Westlaw. 
200. See Office of the Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Readiness & Force 
Mgmt., Defense Manpower Requirements Report: Fiscal Year 
2015, at 69–100 (2014) (tables showing active duty military demographics); 
Koo & Maguen, supra note 186, at 27–28 (observing that twelve percent of 
the servicemembers activated in Iraq and Afghanistan were women and that 
the number of women who have separated from service in the past twenty 
years has doubled). The Combat Exclusion Policy was rescinded in 2013. At 
the time, branches were provided the opportunity to make the case for 
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will likely increase as women, who are disproportionately the primary 
or only caregiver, are increasingly integrated into military life.201 The 
reality is that caregiving, particularly dependent care arrangements, 
must change during deployments and service. These changes may be 
particularly stressful, and issues may arise pre-, during, and/or post-
deployment. 
Take for example the case of Specialist Alexis Hutchinson, a single 
mom who was given an OTH separation when she missed her flight for 
a one-year deployment to Afghanistan.202 Hutchinson could not find 
someone to care for her ten-month-old son before that flight as her 
arranged caregiver changed her mind only a few days prior.203 She was 
left with the choice of placing her child in foster care and fulfilling her 
orders to deploy or risking penalty for caring for her child and 
disobeying her orders.204 She choose the latter. 
The military tries to prevent servicemembers from being placed in 
the situation where they have to make this choice. The national security 
reality, however, is that all servicemembers—regardless of whether 
someone is on active duty or in the RC—“must be ready to deploy 
throughout the world on short notice and be able to fully execute their 
military duties.”205 This mission often conflicts with a caregiver’s 
obligations to family members. As a result, in recognition that 
caregiving may be impacted by service, the military requires single and 
dual military caregivers to create and maintain a family care plan that 
 
continuing to exclude women from certain military positions. No exceptions 
were allowed after review, and as of January 1, 2016, all “remaining 
occupations and positions [were opened] to women.” Ash Carter, Remarks on 
the Women-in-Service Review, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Dec. 3, 2015), 
http://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/632495/ 
remarks-on-the-women-in-service-review [https://perma.cc/RTX4-CBDS]. 
201. See Cheryl Pellerin, Carter Opens All Military Occupations, Positions to 
Women, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.defense.gov/ 
News-Article-View/Article/632536/carter-opens-all-military-occupations-
positions-to-women [https://perma.cc/W5JW-XY8C]. 
202. James Dao, Single Mother Is Spared Court-Martial, N.Y. Times (Feb. 11, 
2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/12/us/12awolmom.html [https:// 
perma.cc/C4LE-D9BA]. 
203. Id.; Wadsworth & Southwell, supra note 196, at 2.  
204. Nicole Allen, How Well Does the Military Treat Single Mothers?, The 
Atlantic (Feb. 12, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/ 
2010/02/how-well-does-the-military-treat-single-mothers/346662/ [https:// 
perma.cc/AEC4-NP89].  
205. Veterans for America, The American Veterans and 
Servicemembers Survival Guide 392 (2d ed. 2008), https://www.nvlsp. 
org/images/products/survivalguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/LC93-EZGJ]. 
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identifies who will care for loved ones when service must come first.206 
Such a plan must cover who will care for any dependent(s) for which 
the servicemember is responsible should deployment or other orders 
require it.207 Failing to create such a plan—or to update an existing plan 
if options change—may result in “disciplinary or administrative action” 
up to separation.208 Any potential disciplinary action related to the 
failure to update or utilize the plan would be at the discretion of a 
person’s supervisor.209 Generally, this type of failure to fulfil one’s 
military obligations “because of parenthood” getting in the way of 
mission readiness leads to an honorable separation.210 But as 
Hutchinson’s case demonstrated, things sometimes happen despite the 
existence of a family care plan and the best of intentions, and an OTH 
may result instead of an honorable separation.211 
When caregiving arrangements fail, the servicemember also may 
apply for a hardship discharge or emergency leave to deal with the 
personal emergency.212 But this also is at the discretion of command. 
Stories have surfaced where that type of discharge or leave was denied, 
and people were later given an OTH separation when the person went 
AWOL to deal with the emergency. For example, a divorced National 
Guard mother was deployed to Iraq and returned to the states with the 
permission of her supervisors to deal with a custody situation in which 
her daughter was placed in danger by her ex-husband.213 When custody 
 
206. U.S. Dep’t of Def., Department of Defense Instruction 1342.19, 
Family Care Plans (2010), https://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/ 
pdf/134219p.pdf [https://perma.cc/4U79-QB8J]. 
207. Veterans for America, supra note 205, at 510–12. For each branch’s 
requirements, see U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Reg. 635-200, Active Duty 
Enlisted Administrative Separations 6-1–6-11 (2011); U.S. Dep’t of 
the Navy, Naval Military Personnel Manual, art. 1910-124 (2015); 
U.S. Marine Corps, Family Care Plans, MCO 1740.13A (1993); U.S. 
Dep’t of the Air Force, Family Care Plans, AFI 36-2908 (2014). 
208. Department of Defense Instruction 1342.19, supra note 206, at 2. 
209. Id.; see, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, AFI 36-2908, Family Care 
Plans (2014) (stating that the commander or first sergeant is responsible 
to take disciplinary action according to AFI 36-3208). 
210. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, Naval Military Personnel Manual, art. 
1910-124 (2015). 
211. Mullane, supra note 198.  
212. Servicemembers may apply for an administrative separation based on a 
“hardship.” See U.S. Dep’t of Def., Department of Defense 
Instruction 1332.14, Enlisted Administrative Separations 10 
(2014). 
213. Amy Engeler, Deployed Military Parents: Choosing Custody or Duty, 
SFGate (July 16, 2009, 4:00 AM), https://www.sfgate.com/magazine/ 
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could not be resolved during the length of her approved leave, the 
woman decided not to return to her unit in Iraq.214 Shortly after this, 
she was charged with desertion.215 After some media attention, she 
received an honorable discharge.216 But again, not everyone has been so 
lucky. For example, a single father who was a Specialist in the Army 
claimed that he was given the choice to leave his four-year-old with a 
stranger and show up to his shift while his involuntary separation for 
parenthood was being processed or be dishonorably discharged for 
disobeying a supervisor’s order to report to work.217 
There are also a number of discharge upgrade cases where the for-
mer servicemember argued that the military denied a hardship dis-
charge, and the person caring for a family member ended up receiving 
an OTH separation. For example, someone who went AWOL to care 
for his father with a disability and mother who had been injured had 
received an OTH separation. His attempts to upgrade the discharge 
were denied.218 
Similarly, a pregnant servicemember may ask for a discharge, which 
would generally be deemed honorable.219 But the military has the option 
of refusing to separate the person from service if it is in “the best 
interest” of the military to retain the person.220 Further, command 
retains control over the type of separation that is initiated and stories 
have surfaced of discharges related to pregnancy and associated post-
pregnancy conditions such as post-partum depression.221 In addition, 
there was a period of time when the commander of the military’s forces 
in northern Iraq instituted a policy that banned pregnancy and 
 
article/Deployed-Military-Parents-Choosing-Custody-or-2479433.php 
[https://perma.cc/TW4S-WCJ5]. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. 
216. Id. 
217. Thread: Seperation [sic] Under Family Care Plan, Army Study Guide 
(June 17, 2012, 3:39 PM), https://community.armystudyguide.com/ 
groupee/forums/a/tpc/f/6871093521/m/8607063126 [https://perma.cc/ 
U2PM-F8N8] (comments of a servicemember on a forum). 
218. See ABCSA No. AR20100009594, https://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/ 
BCMR/CY2010/20100009594.txt [https://perma.cc/4YZZ-VP7W].  
219. The American Veterans and Servicemembers Survival Guide, 
supra note 205, at 391. 
220. Department of Defense Instruction 1332.14, supra note 212, at 11. 
221. The American Veterans and Servicemembers Survival Guide, supra 
note 205, at 390–92. 
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punished servicemembers with a court-martial if the policy was 
violated.222 
These stories demonstrate that caregiving, in all of its forms, may 
lead to OTH separations at the discretion of command despite the 
directive dictating honorable discharges for this purpose. All of these 
military caregivers currently are denied access to USERRA’s labor 
standards. 
5. Excluding People with OTH Separations Ignores USERRA’s 
Purpose and is Inconsistent with a History of  
Inclusion and Fairness Amongst Types of Service. 
Other calls to expand USERRA’s coverage have been made over 
the years.223 Based on the experiences with OTH separations during the  
222. See Max Fisher, Military Pregnancy Ban: What’s the Point, The Wire 
(Dec. 22, 2009, 3:41 PM), https://www.thewire.com/politics/2009/12/ 
military-pregnancy-ban-what-s-the-point/26035/ [https://perma.cc/US8Q-
X29S] (commenting on the futility of such a policy); U.S. Military Drops 
Ban on Soldiers Getting Pregnant, CNN (Dec. 25, 2009, 8:55 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/12/25/iraq.us.soldiers.pregna
nt/ [https://perma.cc/P7JS-XNYU] (describing the end to the ban). 
223. The most common call seeks to expand the definition of “uniformed service” 
to include active duty service pursuant to state orders. Under USERRA 
§ 4313(a), reemployment rights only attach if the leave is needed for “service 
in the uniformed services.” USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4313(a) (2012). The 
relevant definition for this phrase excludes state service obligations. Id. § 
4303(13). While all states have a law that protects the reemployment of 
members of the National Guard in some fashion, the majority of those laws 
only cover service performed in that state. Sam Wright, State Law 
Protections for National Guard Members on State Active Duty, Serv. 
Members L. Ctr.: L. Rev. 15032, (Apr. 2015), 
https://www.servicemembers-lawcenter.org/uploads/15032-LR.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/LW4V-PB4T]; Email from Sam Wright to Col. Blomquist (June 
6, 2015) (on file with author) (noting that thirty-two states have this 
problematic loophole). This creates a problem when members of the National 
Guard are mobilized to respond to a problem in a different state. While 
outside the scope of this Article, it makes sense for USERRA to be amended 
to cover this cross-state service. Regardless of who authorizes the service, it 
is being conducted in pursuit of the safety and security of the country. Other 
proposals include calls to expand the definition to protect the self-employed, 
address occupational memberships and licenses, and to cover student 
servicemembers. See, e.g., Wedlund, supra note 39, at 842–44 (discussing 
several areas that lack USERRA protection and what some states have done 
to close these gaps); Marcel Quinn, Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA)—Broad in Protections, Inadequate in 
Scope, 8 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 237 (2005) (exploring the failures of 
USERRA to cover students and state calls to duty); GAO-08-790R, supra 
note 16, at 4 (“Neither DOD nor the services have been collecting the 
necessary data to track and monitor what impact active duty service may 
have on reservists’ ability to maintain civilian professional licenses and 
certifications.”). Further, while it is also outside the scope of this Article, the 
author will propose coverage for military families who may be subject to 
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Gulf War-Era II described above, this Article goes further by seeking 
an elimination of one of the character of service exclusions. Specifically, 
it proposes to remove 38 U.S.C. § 3404(b) in its entirety. 
As is, this exclusion contradicts the purpose underlying the law. It 
chills people from volunteering for service by conditioning the right to 
access USERRA’s labor standards on a specific type of service. The 
major problem with this is that the type of discharge is not known at 
the time of entry. Rather, the designation (and thus, exclusion from 
coverage) comes only after service. Thus, the very people that the 
country wants to encourage to serve with promises of workforce pro-
tections will not know that those protections will not be available to 
them until after service—of course, neither will their employer. 
This reality of timing is the very reason that one of USERRA’s 
predecessors was amended to offer labor standards to people who 
applied for, but were ultimately rejected from, service.224 An issue arose 
about whether someone who left to take a military entry examination 
(a test to determine one’s physical fitness for service), but was 
ultimately rejected by the military, should be entitled to job re-
instatement. As a result, USERRA was amended to clarify that people 
who were asked to engage in pre-service examinations were entitled to 
job protection, regardless of whether they ultimately were accepted into 
service or rejected by the military. The right to job-protection was 
extended from the time of examination through the decision on whether 
someone will be inducted into service. This recognized the reality that 
volunteers for service would not know whether they would be rejected 
from service at the time they leave work.225 The same logic holds true 
for OTH separations. 
In addition to helping USERRA live up to its statutory purpose, 
the proposal would follow a long history of amending the law to provide 
fairness amongst types of service and to fix inconsistencies in coverage. 
One need only look to the changing coverage for length and type of 
service over the years for an example. Originally, only people who were 
conscripted into active duty service in the regular Armed Forces were 
given the benefit of reemployment rights in 1940. Coverage was 
expanded to people who volunteered for active duty later that year.226 
In 1948, RC members were given reemployment rights for up to three  
adverse employment actions by employers because of an association with 
someone in uniformed service in a future article. 
224. See USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4303(13) (2012) (defining “service in the 
uniformed services” to include “a period for which a person is absent from a 
position of employment for the purpose of an examination to determine the 
fitness of the person to perform any such duty”). 
225. Universal Military Training and Service Act, Pub. L. No. 87-391, 75 Stat 
821, 822 (1961). 
226. Service Extension Act of 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-213, § 7, 55 Stat. 626, 627. 
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years of active duty.227 This was expanded to four years of protection 
in 1951 during the Korean War.228 A fifth year of protection later was 
authorized in 1968 if and only if that extra service was “at the request 
and for the convenience of the Federal Government.”229 Finally, in 
recognition of the difficulty in administering the law with some of these 
nuances and in response to fairness concerns of having different 
amounts of service protected for different groups of servicemembers, 
protection for up to five years was universally granted with USERRA 
in 1994.230 
Congress also eliminated an inconsistency that previously gave 
different types of servicemembers varying lengths of time to apply to 
return to work after a service-connected injury. At one point, some RC 
members with injuries were not given any extension of time to reapply 
to return to work; others were given a six-month grace period after a 
service-related hospitalization, and regular members of the Armed 
Forces were given a yearlong grace period. This “inconsistent 
treatment” was problematic for Congress, which acted to provide the 
same protection for anyone who was injured during training or active 
duty.231 
Further, Congress has repeatedly acted to amend the law after 
disparities surfaced between protections given to different members of 
the RC for the same type and length of service. For example, during 
1960, Congress changed the law to fix inconsistent protections based 
solely on length and type of service for RC members. Previously, a  
227. Selective Service Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-759, § 9(b)(B)(ii), 62 Stat. 
604, 614–15; S. Rep. No. 80-1268, at 17 (1948). 
228. Universal Military Training and Service Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 82-
51, § 9(g), 65 Stat. 75, 85 (1951) (changing earlier text that offered 
reemployment only for someone’s first enlistment); H.R. Rep. No. 87-1082, 
at 2 (1961) (“This group would acquire reemployment rights based on a 
period of service equal to the amount of time they may be involuntarily 
recalled to active duty and those involuntarily extended would have their 
status fully clarified to assure them similar reemployment rights 
protection.”); S. Rep. No. 82-117, at 4–5 (1951) (demonstrating that 
Congress was acting to improve RC coverage in response to the Korean 
War). 
229. Universal Military Training and Service Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 90-
491, § 9(g), 82 Stat. 790, 790 (1968). 
230. See Rocco J. Maffei, The Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act, I am Being Mobilized, What About My 
Civilian Job? 4 (n.d.); Eric Rosoff, Note, Disparate Treatment of Disparate 
Treatment: Harmonizing Title VII Pretext and Mixed-Motive Jury 
Instruction Causation Standards in Light of Staub v. Memorial Hospital, 35 
Cardozo L. Rev. 2079, 2106 (2014) (“Congress designed the provision to 
provide the same employment protections enjoyed by regular veterans to 
those serving as reservists.”). 
231. H.R. Rep. No. 86-1263, at 2 (1960). 
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member of the National Guard had “inferior” rights to those of a re-
servist performing the same training duty. The law was amended to 
“give equal treatment for the same training.”232 The goal was “to 
eliminate certain inequities and inconsistencies” by providing all RC 
personnel “with identical reemployment rights.”233 Another example of 
Congress meeting this goal includes the expansion to cover the Coast 
Guard and Public Health Service Reserve Components for the first time 
in USERRA.234 This history bolsters the claim that Congress 
consistently corrects coverage exclusions on fairness grounds once 
problems surface.235 Removing the OTH exclusion offers Congress 
another opportunity to do so. 
B. Extending the Reasonable Efforts Requirements to Match the Length 
of Time for Which Cause Protection is Granted. 
In addition to expanding coverage to those with OTH separations, 
this proposal suggests that the reemployment and continued economic 
security of servicemembers could be improved by extending the length 
of the accommodation provisions. Currently, an employer’s obligations 
to provide reasonable accommodations and accommodations plus end 
the moment someone is reinstated. This is because the requirements for 
employers to make reasonable efforts to help qualify someone for his or 
her escalator (or closest equivalent) position are found in 38 U.S.C. 
§ 4313(a)—the reemployment section of the law. Once someone has 
 
232. Id.; see also Consideration of H.R. 5040, to Amend and Clarify the 
Reemployment Provisions of the Universal Military Training and Service 
Act, and for Other Purposes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Armed 
Services Subcomm. No. 1, 86th Cong. 2641 (1960) [hereinafter Hearings on 
Consideration of H.R. 5040] (statement of Hugh Bradley, Director of Bureau 
of Reemployment Rights, Dep’t of Labor) (noting the inferior rights for 
members of the National Guard with respect to the initial period of active 
duty for training). 
233. Hearings on Consideration of H.R. 5040, supra note 232, at 2639 
(statement of Paul J. Kilday, Chairman, S. Subcomm. No. 1). 
234. See Statement on Signing the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 2 Pub. Papers 1746, 1747 (Oct. 13, 
1994) (President Clinton noted that the Act “extends coverage for the first 
time to the Coast Guard and Public Health Service Reserve Components”). 
235. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 86-1672, at 4–5 (1960) (letter from James T. 
O’Connell, Acting Sec’y of Labor, to Hon. Carl Vinson, Chairman, H.R. 
Comm. on Armed Services) (“One realistic purpose of this bill, therefore, is 
to give these comparable groups comparable reemployment rights.”); H.R. 
Rep. No. 103-65, at 23 (1993) (“Under current law, entitlements and 
eligibility criteria for reemployment rights differ based upon categories of 
military training or duty. It is the Committee’s view that those distinctions 
are no longer appropriate for reemployment rights purposes and only lead to 
confusion and anomalous results in some cases . . . .”). 
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been reemployed, the obligation ends under that section as the 
employer’s responsibilities have been fulfilled. 
The proposal would tie these responsibilities to the requirements in 
the labor standard related to the exception for at-will employment.236 
Under the proposal, employers would need to make affirmative, 
reasonable efforts for six months or one year depending on the length 
of someone’s service. The same reason underlying the cause 
protection—providing teeth to the reemployment protection—applies 
to the need for accommodations. The underlying logic is the same; it 
makes no sense to require employers to provide accommodations to help 
someone (re)qualify for a job, and then allow the person to become 
unqualified for the reemployment position the next day after the 
employer’s duty has been satisfied. 
Although this would impose an additional burden on employers, 
the burden is not unfettered. Employers would still be able to rely on 
the existing affirmative defenses. If making reasonable efforts after re-
instatement would impose an undue hardship on the employer, the 
employer would not have to do so.237 In addition to the undue hardship 
defense, employers would be protected if anyone with an OTH 
separation committed a crime after returning to work that could also 
constitute cause for termination.238 These protections for employers 
offer a balance of the employer’s needs with the reality of the ex-
periences of those with service connected injuries returning to work, like 
the experiences described by the forgotten Gulf War-Era II troops in 
the preceding sections. 
In addition to respecting the needs of various parties, this proposal 
bolsters USERRA’s consistent and long-standing role as a model in 
workplace protections for returning servicemembers with disabilities.239 
From early on in the law’s history, Congress expressed concern about 
the needs of servicemembers returning to civilian employment with 
service-connected injuries or impairments that were exacerbated by 
service. Special protections have been created and consistently 
expanded to address new needs as they surfaced. For example, 
 
236. See USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4316(b)(6) (2012) (“The entitlement of a person 
to a right or benefit under an employee pension benefit plan is provided for 
under section 4318.”). 
237. See id. § 4312(d)(1)(B) (“An employer is not required to reemploy a person 
under this chapter if . . . such employment would impose an undue hardship 
on the employer.”). 
238. See id. § 4316(c) (requiring that a “person who is reemployed by an 
employer . . . shall not be discharged except for cause”). 
239. See generally Waterstone, supra note 109 (providing an excellent 
exploration of the intersection of USERRA and the ADA, as well as 
situating the experiences of veterans with disabilities in the context of the 
larger disability movement). 
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beginning in 1944, servicemembers who were hospitalized after military 
discharge were given additional time after the end of hospitalization to 
notify their civilian employer that they intended to return to work.240 
Further, USERRA already demonstrates a desire for USERRA to 
be a model, expansive law to protect service-connected injuries 
(including PTSD and TBI). This is evidenced in Congress’ willingness 
to go beyond the provisions of the ADA in USERRA. Specifically, 
USERRA protections cover a much broader category of illnesses and 
injuries. USERRA covers any injury incurred or aggravated during 
service; it does not require employees to meet a three-prong test of what 
constitutes a disability as is required under the ADA.241 This means 
that transitory and short duration, non-chronic impairments are 
covered under USERRA even though they are excluded from the 
definition of disability under the ADA as amended by the ADA 
Amendments Act.242 The only requirement is that the injury relate to 
service. Under USERRA, returning servicemembers with these impair-
ments also are entitled to reemployment in alternative positions if 
qualified and, if no such position is available, sick leave or light duty 
 
240. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 Amendment, Pub. L. No. 78-473, 
58 Stat. 798 (1944). The 1944 law provided for a one-year extension after 
hospitalization. Id. This period was later expanded to the current two year 
timeframe for someone to apply for reemployment. USERRA 
§ 4312(e)(2)(A) (“Except as provided in subparagraph (B), such period of 
recovery may not exceed two years.”); see also 20 C.F.R. § 1002.116 (2016) 
(“This period may not exceed two years from the date of the completion of 
service . . . .”); Beasley, Jr. & Pagnattaro, supra note 97, at 159–60 
(describing USERRA’s special provision for servicemembers with 
disabilities). There was an attempt to reduce the time frame back to one 
year during the debate over USERRA. The attempt failed, and USERRA 
clarified that the timeframe to provide notice of intent to return begins to 
run on the date of discharge from hospitalization, not from the date of 
separation from service. 140 Cong. Rec. 24,426 (1994) (joint explanatory 
statement). Further, the “two-year period would be extended by the 
minimum time required to accommodate the circumstance beyond the 
individual’s control which makes reporting within the time limit impossible 
or unreasonable.” Id.  
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012) (“The term disability means . . . (A) a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major 
life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) 
being regarded as having such impairment.”). 
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (2012) (excluding transitory and minor 
impairments that last less than six months from the ADA’s definition of 
disability); see also Kevin Barry, Brian East & Marcy Karin, Pleading 
Disability After the ADAAA, 31 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 1, 20 (2013) 
(noting that the ADA’s disability definition “does not cover employees who 
are treated adversely based on a ‘transitory and minor’ impairment”). 
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assignments must be provided until the person is recovered.243 Taken 
together, this means that someone has a right to another job if a dis-
ability cannot be accommodated under USERRA. These options are 
not easily obtained under the ADA. Given this background, it is in-
consistent to offer accommodations related to reemployment for service-
connected trauma only to some, and not all, members who experience 
it. 
Further, as noted in Part I, USERRA also goes beyond the ADA 
by affirmatively requiring employers to help servicemembers become 
qualified for their escalator positions.244 The legislative history makes 
clear that Congress was thinking about technological advances and the 
training that would be needed to update those skills when someone 
returns.245 This retraining concept is also at the heart of the provision 
that prevents employers from discharging returned servicemembers 
except for cause for a period of time.246 It exhibits an understanding 
that the time “away from a job may cause an employee’s skills to 
become rusty.”247 This training requirement allows returning workers to 
“refresh their skills” and obtain “training on new equipment installed 
in their absence” in advance of any determination that the person is 
not qualified for the position.248 It reflects that “rapidly changing 
technology in the workplace may require that employees be given a 
significant period of time to learn how the job has changed.”249 Given 
this legislative history and the similar concepts underlying both the 
accommodation and cause labor standards, it makes sense to tie them 
to the same time frame. 
In sum, it is inconsistent for Congress to offer expansive disability 
and retraining provisions, but fail to address the impact of service-
connected trauma and other injuries on conduct underlying OTH 
separations that would help people adjust to living with these injuries 
in civilian workplaces. Without this change, the military misconduct  
243. See 20 C.F.R. § 1002.226 (2016) (“The employer must make reasonable 
efforts to help the employee to become qualified to perform the duties of 
this position.”). 
244. See USERRA, 38 U.S.C. § 4303(10) (2012) (requiring an employer to take 
“actions, including training provided by an employer, that do not place an 
undue hardship on the employer”). 
245. 137 Cong. Rec. 7067 (1991); H.R. Rep. No. 103–65, at 31 (1993) 
(statement of Rep. G.V. Montgomery). 
246. 139 Cong. Rec. 27,139 (1993) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller). 
247. Id. at 27,141–42. 
248. Id. at 27,142. 
249. Id.; see also S. Rep. No. 102-16, at 13 (1991) (“This provision would ensure 
that servicemembers who, by reason of absence while serving on active duty, 
missed opportunities to acquire new skills necessary to meet the changing 
requirements of their previous jobs would be given a reasonable amount of 
time and assistance from their employers in order to become requalified.”). 
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catch-22 reappears. Thus, this proposal would give this coverage 
strength, and increase holistic support to veterans with service-
connected injuries to help them actually readjust to civilian work and 
stay connected to the workforce over time. 
III. Anticipating Critiques and Situating the Proposal 
in Larger Movements 
Some might criticize the proposal outlined in the last Part as dis-
respectful to those who have served “honorably” and as unrealistic 
because it involves Congressional action. As explained below, both 
critiques fail. 
A. Including People with OTH Separations Does Not  
Disrespect Other Servicemembers 
This proposal may engender some of the same critiques that other 
proposals to extend the benefits of service to people with OTH separ-
ations have received, mainly that “granting such benefits would dis-
respect the vast majority of service members who go to war and com-
plete their service honorably.”250 This critique, however, ignores the 
reality of the experiences of some of the people who obtain OTH sep-
arations, the underlying statutory purpose of USERRA, and the fair-
ness concerns articulated above. 
Since the first workplace protection for this community was enacted 
in 1940, the country has learned a number of lessons about war and 
workplaces. The military has learned about the impact of service-
connected disabilities, and the experiences of modern warfare are 
different than they were back then. Advances in military gear and 
medicine have changed the face of warfare and large numbers of mil-
itary personnel who would have died in conflict seventy-five years ago 
are coming back with service-connected injuries instead. A law that was 
enacted for a draft-based service in a different era no longer flies. 
Instead, if the country wants to encourage people to enlist or stay on 
after an initial period of service is complete, the promise that the 
country will take care of them, particularly if one gets wounded, is 
paramount. Access to these protections is needed to make sure that the 
promise of supporting people who serve is not a false one.251 
 
250. Bernton, supra note 141. 
251. See, e.g., Samuel F. Wright, USERRA Applies to Hiring Hall Situations, 
Serv. Members L. Ctr.: L. Rev. 183 (July–Aug. 2005), 
https://www.servicemembers-lawcenter.org/LAW_REVIEW_183.html 
[https://perma.cc/N9KW-C8TC] (urging a general contractors’ trade 
association to honor veterans’ reemployment rights under USERRA). 
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1. Other Civil Laws that Support the Military Community Do Not 
Exclude People with OTH Separations. 
As noted above, there are a number of supports that are taken away 
from people who receive an OTH separation.252 Not all supports, 
however, are automatically removed with this type of separation. 
Rather, a growing number of legal protections applicable to reinte-
gration efforts in all components of civilian life remain. 
First, this proposal is consistent with other employment laws that 
support the reintegration of veterans into the civilian workforce. For 
example, the Vietnam Era Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act 
(VEVRAA) requires government contractors to take affirmative action 
to increase workforce attachment for certain groups of veterans.253 
VEVRAA defines a veteran as “a person who served in the active 
military, naval, or air service, and who was discharged or released 
therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable.”254 While it 
excludes punitive discharges from coverage, VEVRAA is silent as to 
OTH separations. The Article’s proposal would provide consistency 
between USERRA and VEVRAA with respect to protecting the post-
service employment opportunities of veterans with OTH separation. 
Second, the proposal also comports with laws that offer civilian 
support to military personnel outside of the employment context 
regardless of one’s character of service. For example, another law that 
provides expansive civil protections to those in uniformed service is the 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act (SCRA).255 Similar to USERRA’s 
purpose, the SCRA is meant “to provide for, strengthen, and expedite 
the national defense . . . [by] enabl[ing servicemembers] to devote their 
entire energy to the defense needs of the Nation.”256 The law essentially 
puts judicial, administrative, and transactional proceedings on hold 
during a period of military service if that proceeding or event would 
“adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during their military  
252. See supra notes 143–148 and accompanying text. 
253. Pub. L. No. 92-540, 86 Stat. 1074 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 38 U.S.C.). 
254. 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012); see also 41 C.F.R. § 60-300.2(cc) (2015) (“Veteran 
means a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service of the 
United States, and who was discharged or released therefrom under 
conditions other than dishonorable.”). 
255. 50 U.S.C. app. § 501 (2012). The SCRA represents another law Congress is 
willing to amend on a regular basis that stems from an earlier time period. 
See, e.g., Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 65-103, 40 Stat. 
440 (1918) (an example of a similar law Congress has amended on a regular 
basis); Michael D. Schag, Servicemember and Veterans Rights § 
3.02 (2016), Westlaw (observing that the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief 
Act was amended thirteen times from 1918 to 2003). 
256. 50 U.S.C. app. § 502(1). 
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service.”257 A “period of military service” ends when the person “is 
released from military service or dies while in military service.”258 There 
is no condition of service imposed on the type of release. 
Moreover, some of the SCRA’s protections extend after service,259 
and would be available to people with OTH separations. For example, 
the SCRA provides servicemembers ninety days from the date of 
separation to file a dispute of a default judgment that was issued during 
active duty or within sixty days thereafter.260 Another provision gives 
members a ninety-day grace period to enforce their rights or bring the 
SCRA to the attention of the adjudicator.261 While members who are 
AWOL or in deserter status are not afforded these or other SCRA 
protections,262 there is no exclusion based on an OTH separation. 
Further, at least one court has held that servicemembers who have 
committed misconduct or crimes under the military code are still 
entitled to SCRA protections, even if they are being confined (e.g., 
conduct that will result in a punitive discharge as opposed to the 
administrative OTH separation) as the imprisonment is service-
connected.263 Finally, an argument for consistency with the SCRA 
makes sense given the long-standing Supreme Court precedent inter-
preting a prior version of the SCRA in the same way that early versions 
of USERRA were interpreted.264 Mainly, the Court has held that both 
laws are to be given liberal construction in favor of people who “drop 
their own affairs to take up the burdens of the nation.”265  
257. Id. § 502(2). 
258. Id. § 511(3) (emphasis added). 
259. See, e.g., Lowe v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 218, 225 (2007) (noting that 
the SCRA tolls servicemembers’ statutes of limitations for civil liability 
during their periods of military service.); Walters v. Nadell, 751 N.W.2d 
431, 439 (Mich. 2008) (finding the tolling provision of the SCRA 
“mandatory, but not self-executing”). 
260. 50 U.S.C. app. § 521(g). 
261. Id. § 522; see also Schag, supra note 255, § 3.03 (citing Lowe, 79 Fed. Cl. 
at 227) (“[T]he Court of Federal Claims . . . held that a servicemember who 
is confined during a period of service is considered on ‘active duty’ and 
subject to the protections of SCRA.”). 
262. Schag, supra note 255, § 3.03 (citing United States v. Hampshire, 95 F.3d 
999 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
263. See, e.g., Lowe, 79 Fed. Cl. at 227 (“It can hardly be said that those service 
members subject to that system—even when tried, convicted, and 
incarcerated under military law—are not engaging in activities that are 
‘service-connected.’”). 
264. Compare Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943) (interpreting the SCRA), 
with Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946) 
(interpreting early version of USERRA). 
265. Boone, 319 U.S. at 575; Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285. 
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Third, the proposal is consistent with the recent (and growing) 
trend to allow misconduct and criminal activity committed by former 
servicemembers to be heard by a special, therapeutic-focused veterans 
treatment court. These courts specialize in working with veterans with 
drug problems, substance abuse, or service-connected mental illnesses.266 
These courts recognize that society and its systems need to acknowledge 
that certain criminal activity is impacted by or manifests from self-
medication in response to or as symptoms of service-connected 
disabilities.267 In the five years after the first of these courts appeared 
in 2008 in Buffalo, NY, over 150 others were created.268 Each has its 
own modality with respect to subject matter and eligibility, but all are 
built on the premise that service-related issues have an impact on the 
criminal justice system and an alternative model may be needed to 
combat this reality.269 Most of these courts do not exclude people with 
OTH separations from participating. Rather, these courts recognize 
that service may have created a pattern of misconduct in which 
someone feels stuck in a hole. These courts offer a rope out of that hole. 
So, too, could workforce attachment and USERRA protections. 
Amending USERRA to recognize the impact that service may have 
on someone is consistent with other workplace, civil and criminal laws, 
and systems that offer military supportive protections without 
excluding members with OTH separations. 
2. Other Workplace Laws Do Not Deny Coverage Automatically Based 
on Prior Misconduct. 
This proposal is also consistent with a growing movement not to 
deny workplace protections based on prior criminal activity or records 
 
266. Jayme M. Cassidy, Suddenly Discharged the Combat Continues: 
Eliminating the Legal Services Gap to Ensure Veterans’ Success After 
Leaving Military Service, 45 U. Mem. L. Rev. 837, 877 (2015). 
267. See Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice: 
The Suspended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders 
with PTSD and TBI and Reduce Recidivism, 208 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 2 (2011) 
(“Recognizing that these wounded warriors experience symptoms that often 
manifest in criminal conduct, this justice system incorporates advanced 
‘problem-solving’ strategies in its sentencing practices.”). 
268. Robert T. Russell, Veterans Treatment Courts Developing Throughout the 
Nation, in Future Trends in State Courts 2009, 130, 130 (Carol R. 
Flango et al. eds., 2009); Jim McGuire et al., An Inventory of VA 
Involvement in Veterans Courts, Dockets and Tracks 4–5 (Feb. 7, 
2013), https://www.justiceforvets.org/sites/default/files/gallery/An%20 
Inventory%20of%20VA%20involvement%20in%20Veterans%20Courts_1.p
df [https://perma.cc/5DCV-SK7C]. 
269. See generally Jayme Cassidy & Kristine A. Huskey, Servicemember 
and Veterans Rights § 10.01 (2016), Westlaw (providing an overview of 
veterans treatment courts, which now number over 350). 
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of any such activity. This movement includes efforts to create employ-
ment discrimination laws that “ban the box.”270 “Ban the box” refers to 
the checkbox on employment applications asking if an applicant has 
ever been convicted of a crime. Currently, there is no federal statutory 
requirement to ban the box. Nonetheless, people have successfully 
brought cases alleging that this practice is illegal under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.271 The theory is that a prospective employer’s 
decision not to hire someone on the sole basis of a prior conviction (i.e., 
the person checked the box) causes a disparate impact based on race or 
national origin. For example, the use of criminal records to deny 
employment was held to be discrimination under the disparate impact 
theory when an employer refused to hire someone based on prior 
convictions, as it disproportionately disadvantaged minority applicants 
who had more arrest and conviction rates than their non-minority 
counterparts.272 These cases do not find that “the box” can never be 
used; rather, they require that it be a bona fide occupational 
qualification to ask about criminal history.273 
Although there is no per se violation of Title VII if an employer 
uses criminal history to make an employment decision, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has long taken the posi-
tion that the use of criminal history questions may be unlawful race or 
national origin discrimination under either the disparate treatment or 
disparate impact theory. After numerous hearings on the subject, most 
recently in 2008 and 2011,274 the EEOC updated its existing en-
forcement guidance on the subject in 2012.275 Of relevance to USERRA’s 
statutory OTH exclusion, the EEOC’s updated guidance confirms that 
not all use of criminal history is illegal; rather, employers with a job-
 
270. See Neal Miller, Criminal Convictions, “Off-Duty Misconduct,” and Federal 
Employment: The Need for Better Definition of the Basis for Disciplinary 
Action, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 869, 897–901 (1990) (contains a helpful 
discussion of this movement). 
271. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (2012). 
272. See, e.g., Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632 (9th Cir. 1972) 
(observing a reliance on evidence that minorities were twice as likely to be 
arrested and convicted nationally). 
273. Miller, supra note 270, at 897–98. 
274. Meeting Transcript Regarding Use of Criminal Convictions in Employment 
Records, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (July 26, 
2011), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/7-26-11/transcript.cfm [https:// 
perma.cc/A3L5-RP67]. 
275. U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Enforcement Guidance on 
the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in 
Employment Decisions Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 (2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_ 
conviction.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC3G-BUAD]. 
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related reason that is consistent with business necessity may ask 
questions to screen out individuals with a criminal record and avoid 
liability.276 Others may not, however, and an across the board ban 
without a reason is problematic. 
The EEOC guidance will not be the last word on the federal level. 
In fact, on November 2, 2015, President Obama announced a series of 
executive actions aimed at banning the box for hiring purposes.277 
Specifically, federal agencies were instructed to delay inquiries into 
criminal history until later in the hiring process for most federal jobs. 
The goal is to ensure that qualified applicants are not rejected before 
they are referred to a hiring manager.278 In addition, there are ban the 
box proposals pending in Congress. The Fair Chance to Compete for 
Jobs Act of 2015, for example, is a bipartisan criminal justice reform 
bill that was introduced to create a legislative ban against asking about 
criminal records for jobs with the federal government and federal 
contractors until after the receipt of a conditional offer.279 
This federal movement bubbles up from the local and state level. 
Twenty-four states and over one-hundred cities and counties have en-
acted ban the box laws.280 Some apply only to public sector workforces; 
but a growing number apply to public or private employers. For 
instance, the Illinois Job Opportunities for Qualified Applicants Act 
prohibits an employer from asking about or looking into an applicant’s 
criminal history until it first determines that he is qualified for the 
position and notifies him that he has been selected for an interview or 
until the employer makes a conditional offer of employment.281 
By analogy, it is time to ban the OTH box. A handful of states 
already prohibit discrimination based on military discharge or character 
of service for many of these same reasons. For example, Illinois protects 
from discrimination because of military status or “unfavorable 
 
276. Id. at 11. 
277. Fact Sheet: President Obama Announces New Actions to Promote 
Rehabilitation and Reintegration for the Formerly-Incarcerated, The White 
House (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/11/02/fact-sheet-president-obama-announces-new-actions-
promote-rehabilitation [https://perma.cc/5DMW-XQUE]. 
278. Id. 
279. Fair Chance Act, S. 2021, 114th Cong. (2015). 
280. Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Beth Avery, Ban the Box: U.S. 
Cities, Counties, and States Adopt Fair-Chance Policies to 
Advance Employment Opportunities for People with Past 
Convictions 1 (2016), https://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Ban-the-
Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/B67Z-
QTQB]. All but one of the state laws has been enacted since 2010. Id.  
281. 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 75/15 (West 2016). 
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discharge from military service in connection with employment.”282 
Wisconsin bans employment action from being taken based on either 
OTH separations or any criminal punishment imposed by the military 
unless “the circumstances of the discharge or separation substantially 
relate to the circumstances of the [employer’s] particular job.”283 Given 
the experiences of the Gulf War-Era II veterans with OTH separations, 
it is time to build on this movement on the federal level and remove 
this exclusion from USERRA’s labor standards. 
B. New Employment Legislation Is Feasible 
Another critique of this proposal would likely be that any legislation 
relating to the workplace is simply not politically feasible in the current 
climate. Numerous scholars have justifiably called attention to the 
reality that new, expansive workplace protections are not likely to be 
enacted anytime soon.284 The 114th Congress was at a political 
stalemate on most issues, and proposals to expand employment law 
have mostly laid dormant on the federal level for over a decade.285 This 
does not mean that proposals have not been introduced, of course. A 
plethora of primarily Democratic bills have been dropped to improve 
conditions for working families and create new labor standards and 
discrimination protections. These include bills to raise the minimum 
wage, increase pay transparency, create paid sick and safe days, offer 
wage replacement to people on job-protected leave, assist with gaining 
access to control and predictability over scheduling, confirm that 
reasonable accommodations are available for pregnant and 
breastfeeding workers, and ensure that LGBT workers are covered by 
anti-discrimination law.286 None have come close to becoming law 
through Congress. Similarly, Republican-sponsored proposals, such as 
allowing compensatory time off in lieu of overtime in the private sector, 
 
282. 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1-102(A) (West 2016). 
283. Wis. Stat. §§ 111.32(3), 111.322, 111.335 (2016) (“Conviction record 
includes . . . information indicating that an individual has been less than 
honorably discharged, or has been placed on probation, fined, imprisoned, 
placed on extended supervision or paroled pursuant to any law enforcement 
or military authority.”). 
284. See, e.g., Rona Kaufman Kitchen, Off-Balance: Obama and the Work-
Family Agenda, 16 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 211, 282–83 (2012) 
(“Today, there is no serious congressional support to adopt expensive work-
family legislation . . . .”). 
285. Cf. Chai R. Feldblum, Policy Challenges and Opportunities for Workplace 
Flexibility: The State of Play, in Work-Life Policies 251 (Ann C. Crouter 
& Alan Booth eds., 2009) (tracing this stalemate through the 2008 
presidential election). 
286. Cf. H.R. Res. 506, 114th Cong. (2015) (outlining the current Democratic 
agenda for legislation to support working families). 
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have gone nowhere.287 Simply put, politics currently makes the creation 
of most new employment laws all but impossible. 
This is a fair critique given the political climate. That said, there 
have been a handful of exceptions where new employment legislation 
has been created. These exceptions generally offer a small segment of 
the workforce a protection to encourage them to make a choice the 
government wants them to make. For example, in 2010, Congress gave 
special protections to non-exempt workingwomen who choose to express 
milk to children under the age of one at work.288 The goal was to 
encourage breastfeeding and increase the rate of its use among low-
income mothers for public health purposes.289 Similar types of 
workplace-based laws (ones to encourage private behavior that does not 
directly relate to the workplace) have also been popping up on the state 
and local levels. For example, there are a number of laws that offer 
labor standards to victims of domestic violence and sexual assault to 
address the aftermaths of crime, regardless of whether any of the 
criminal activity took place at work.290 There is even a state law that 
protects employees from any workplace-based consequence of complying 
with an emergency evacuation order.291 These types of laws have become 
the new normal of employment law, and they are particularly plentiful 
when it comes to dealing with the military population. 
There are also a number of laws that protect workers from being 
penalized at work as a result of being conscripted into a different type 
of public service: serving on a jury.292 The government needs people to 
 
287. See, e.g., Working Families Flexibility Act of 2015, S. 233, 113th Cong. 
(2015). 
288. 29 U.S.C. § 207(r) (2012). 
289. See Karin & Runge, supra note 58, at 344–52 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)) 
(exploring the requirements to offer some workers time off to express milk 
and a location other than a bathroom). 
290. See, e.g., Victims’ Economic Security and Safety Act, 820 Ill. Comp. 
Stat. § 180/15(1), (3) (2015) (“[P]rohibiting employers from 
discriminating against any employee who is a victim of domestic or sexual 
violence or any employee who has a family or household member who is a 
victim of domestic or sexual violence, in a manner that accommodates the 
legitimate interests of employers and protects the safety of all persons in 
the workplace.”). 
291. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 22.002–22.003 (West 2015) (providing 
discrimination protection and reinstatement rights to someone who left 
work pursuant to a public evacuation order). 
292. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1875(a) (2012) (“No employer shall discharge, threaten 
to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any permanent employee by reason of 
such employee’s jury service, or the attendance or scheduled attendance in 
connection with such service, in any court of the United States.”); Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 21-236(B)–(C) (2013) (Arizona state law that prevents 
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serve on juries, and so service in the form of jury duty is compelled. At 
the same time, the government tries to minimize the impact jury service 
has on continued employment and on employers in a way that also 
ensures that the needs of our judiciary system are met. Similarly, the 
government requires a certain amount of job protection to allow citizens 
time off from work to participate in the election process and vote.293 
These laws do not compel “honorable” service as a juror or voter to 
utilize the job protections and return to work at one’s pre-service 
position. 
This value of promoting choice is particularly true when it comes 
to encouraging people to join (or stay in) the military, as well as to 
support those who make this choice. In fact, as described above, this is 
the very concept that underlies USERRA and all of its predecessors. 
The reality is that no politician wants to publicly stand against our 
servicemembers, veterans, or military families to deny them assistance. 
Indeed, as the author has explored in a series of articles, supporting the 
military community at work is one of the few areas where Congress has 
broken through the partisan deadlock in the past.294 For example, 
immediately after the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was enacted 
in 1993,295 there were calls to expand its coverage and protections.296 
Despite these calls, the FMLA’s substantive provisions have been 
amended only twice. First, in 2008, when Congress created two types 
 
employers from preventing an employee from participating as a juror and 
requiring reinstatement). 
293. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-402(A) (2013) (forbidding employers from 
instituting any penalty or deducting the usual salary of employees who are 
absent for the purpose of voting). 
294. See Marcy L. Karin & Katie Onachila, The Military’s Workplace Flexibility 
Framework, 3 Am. U. Lab. & Emp. L.F. 153 (2013) (discussing some of the 
wide-ranging workplace protections afforded to servicemembers and the rest 
of the military community and offering a framework to contextualize these 
unique protections); Marcy Karin, Time Off for Military Families: An 
Emerging Case Study in a Time of War . . . and the Tipping Point for 
Future Laws Supporting Work-Life Balance?, 33 Rutgers L. Rec. 46 
(2009) (noting that employment protections for servicemembers, veterans 
with service-connected disabilities, and military caregivers have received 
strong bipartisan support). 
295. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012). 
296. See, e.g., Nicole Buonocore Porter, Finding a Fix for the FMLA: A New 
Perspective, a New Solution, 31 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 327 (2014) 
(exploring various proposals for reform before offering one of her own); Nicole 
Buonocore Porter, Synergistic Solutions: An Integrated Approach to Solving 
the Caregiver Conundrum for “Real” Workers, 39 Stetson L. Rev. 777, 
789–90, 835–50 (2010) (contextualizing these proposals from an anti-
essentialist perspective); Robin R. Runge, Redefining Leave from Work, 19 
Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 445, 480–82 (2012) (exploring the political 
feasibility of additional FMLA expansions). 
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of protections for military families by requiring some employers to 
provide unpaid job-protected leave for up to: (1) twelve weeks to 
address a qualifying exigency related to a RC member’s federal call to 
active duty or such service; and (2) twenty-six weeks for caregiving of 
a covered servicemember who obtains or aggravates a serious injury or 
illness during such service.297 Second, in 2010, when Congress expanded 
those protections to offer coverage to families of the regular Armed 
Forces and clarify that care for veterans is covered.298 More recently, on 
November 5, 2015, President Obama signed bipartisan legislation to 
provide veterans with service-connected disabilities who are hired by 
the federal government an advance of paid sick leave to attend medical 
appointments (rather than need to wait for it to accrue like other new 
hires).299 As these laws show, at a time when there is Congressional 
gridlock on almost everything, supporting servicemembers with suc-
cessful reintegration efforts back into civilian life may offer a path to 
bipartisanship and an exception to the general impasse. 
In fact, the potential bipartisan nature of legislation to support our 
troops and military families extends beyond the workplace context, 
including covering other areas where wounded warriors or MST reforms 
have been needed. For example, in 2015, the bipartisan Clay Hunt 
Suicide Prevention for American Veterans Act was enacted to improve 
mental health services for veterans with PTSD in an effort to decrease 
the rate of suicide in this group.300 The bipartisan Veterans Traumatic 
Brain Injury Care Improvement Act was enacted in 2014 to improve 
assisted living services for veterans with traumatic brain injury.301 
Recent laws have also addressed MST in a bipartisan and bicameral 
manner.302 Further, other proposals relevant to this population of 
 
297. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
181, § 585, 122 Stat. 3, 128–32 (2008); see generally Karin, supra note 294 
(discussing this FMLA expansion). 
298. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, § 565, 123 Stat. 2190, 2309–12 (2009); see Marcy Karin, Military Families 
and Workplace Flexibility: The National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2010, Work and Family Researchers Network (Nov. 3, 
2009, 2:46 PM), https://workfamily.sas.upenn.edu/content/ 
military-families-and-workplace-flexibility-national-defense-authorization-
act-fiscal-year-2 [https://perma.cc/47L2-L5DM]. The FMLA was also 
expanded to employees of airline flight crews that had previously been 
excluded due to the way this industry calculated hours worked. Airline Flight 
Crew Technical Corrections Act, Pub. L. No. 111-119, 123 Stat. 3476 (2009). 
299. Wounded Warriors Federal Leave Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-75, 129 Stat. 
640 (2015). 
300. Pub. L. No. 114-2, 129 Stat. 30 (2015). 
301. Pub. L. No. 113-257, 128 Stat. 2924 (2014). 
302. For example, the Coast Guard STRONG Act was introduced 
simultaneously in both the House (H.R. 2059, 113th Cong. (2013)) and 
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servicemembers have passed at least one House of Congress in the 114th 
Congress so far. For example, the Ruth Moore Act of 2015 passed the 
House on July 27, 2015 and would make it easier for survivors of 
military sexual trauma who have experienced mental and/or physical 
disabilities to receive VA benefits.303 Moreover, additional proposals for 
reform in response to MST outside of the workplace are pending.304 Any 
of these, especially the annual National Defense Authorization Act, 
which regularly contains workplace protections for the military, could 
serve as a moving vehicle on which the proposal to amend USERRA 
outlined in the last Section could be attached. 
Thus, even though the likelihood of other workplace protections is 
non-existent at this time, the opportunity for this proposal is different. 
It has to be viewed in light of the long history of expanding USERRA 
to reflect the experiences of servicemembers during and after each war 
cohort. Other feasibility factors include the politics of supporting the 
military community generally (and wounded warriors in particular), 
along with the attention given to addressing MST recently. With an 
all-volunteer force, serving in our military is a choice that Congress still 
wants (and needs) people to make. An amendment to USERRA that 
helps people make that choice—particularly given these disparate 
impacts on vulnerable populations that are already receiving significant 
political attention—would not be dead in the water. 
Conclusion 
In 1996, Preston Taylor, Jr., the Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
the Department of Labor’s Veterans Employment Training Services 
testified to Congress that “USERRA was years in the making, with 
careful review along the way by many interested parties. However, it 
seems that no matter how much attention is paid to drafting, imple-
mentation always surfaces a number of previously unnoticed items in 
 
Senate (S. 1050, 113th Cong. (2013)) by bipartisan groups of sponsors. It 
became law as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66, sec. 1712, § 673(b), 127 Stat. 671, 963 (2013) 
(offering MST victims an expedited review of any requests to be transferred 
to a new location away from an alleged assailant). The Defense Sexual 
Trauma Response Oversight and Good Governance Act was introduced by 
a bipartisan group of sponsors in the House (H.R. 1529, 112th Cong. 
(2011)). A modified version became law as part of the NDAA FY 2012, 
Pub. L. No. 112-81, §§ 581–586, 125 Stat. 1298, 1430–36 (2011) (providing, 
among other things, MST victims access to legal counsel and confidentiality 
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303. Ruth Moore Act of 2015, H.R. 1607, 114th Cong. (2015). 
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need of legislative adjustment.”305 After fifteen years of conflict in the 
Gulf War-Era II, building on the lessons of the last seventy-five years, 
the time has come to adjust USERRA once again. While USERRA 
started as a personnel policy to offer a benefit of service to those drafted 
for World War II, it evolved into a method to encourage private 
behavior that the government needed to happen after we moved to an 
all-volunteer force. Over the years, as Assistant Secretary Taylor 
observed, the law has been expanded to fix mistakes, respond to the 
needs of servicemembers, and ensure uniformity amongst types of 
service. The Article makes the case that this work is not done yet. 
Amending USERRA via the proposal described in this Article could 
go a long way to address the discriminatory impact of the military 
misconduct catch-22 on members with OTH separations. It will counter 
the disproportionate impact the existing law has on servicemembers 
with disabilities, who experience MST, or who have caregiving 
responsibilities. It will do this by assisting with economic security and 
the stability of obtaining at least a year of employment to help with 
reintegration back into civilian life. It will offer the promise of 
reintegrating to civilian work without loss of status, position, or 
benefits, which will help the military with morale, future enlistment, 
and the financial costs that the military (and country at large) would 
have to absorb from dealing with a generation of unemployed, returned 
veterans experiencing trauma. 
USERRA was enacted to be a benefit of enlistment and a way for 
the military to take care of its own for life with help from the employer 
community. This proposal will prevent it from becoming another 
example of how some members feel betrayed by the country they 
volunteered to protect. It is time to end Congress’s “other than 
honorable” discrimination. 
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